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I. INTRODUCTION
The Navajo Nation is the largest federally recognized Indian Nation in the
United States with approximately 225,000 enrolled members.1 Approximately
180,000 of those members live within the Navajo Nation, in addition to several
thousand nonmembers who reside or work there.2 The population of the Navajo
Nation includes a workforce that produces goods and provides services in countless and diverse fields. Unfortunately, the full potential of the Navajo workforce
has not yet been reached, as the Navajo Nation suffers from epic levels of unemployment and persistent, generational poverty. “The Official Website of the
Twenty-First Navajo Nation Council” characterizes unemployment and poverty on
the Navajo Nation as “Permanent Issues.”3 The Council’s website states:
In 1997, fifty-six percent of Navajo people lived below the poverty level
and the per capita income was reported to be $5,599. Twenty-four percent
of personal income made on the Navajo Nation is spent on the reservation
leaving vast potential for on-reservation economic development.
High levels of unemployment persist on the Navajo Nation despite our
efforts to find ways to attract various types of businesses to locate on the
reservation to create jobs and spur economic development.
The Navajo Nation is challenged daily by the tasks associated with attracting businesses to an environment that has little or no infrastructure.
On a regular basis, several businesses explore the possibility of locating to

‡ The authors presented portions of this article at the 2009 Annual Conference of the Navajo Nation
Bar Association, Inc., on June 4, 2009, in Flagstaff, Arizona.
* Partner, Shorall McGoldrick Brinkmann, Flagstaff, Arizona. J.D., 1997, Boston College Law
School; B.A., 1992, University of Arizona. The author wishes to thank his wife Christy and his children, Seth
and Emily, for the time that it took to write this article; co-author Justice Raymond Austin for his extensive
knowledge and wisdom regarding the Navajo Preference in Employment Act, the Fundamental Laws of the
Diné, and all matters related to Navajo jurisprudence; and Tamsen Holm, Esq. and David Barrow, Esq. for
providing copies of much of the legislative history cited herein.
** Distinguished Jurist in Residence, Indigenous Peoples Law and Policy Program, James E. Rogers
College of Law, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona; Retired Associate Justice, Navajo Nation Supreme
Court, Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona). Ph.D., 2007, University of Arizona; J.D., 1983, University of
New Mexico Law School; B.S., 1979, Arizona State University. Justice Austin is Diné from the Navajo Nation
in northeastern Arizona.
The authors thank Maia Campbell, Staff Attorney, Indigenous Peoples Law and Policy Program, James E.
Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona, and Ryan D. Dreveskracht, J.D., 2009, James E. Rogers
College of Law, University of Arizona, for their editorial assistance.
1. The Official Website of the 21st Navajo Nation Council, Navajo Nation Profile, http://www.
navajonationcouncil.org/NNprofile.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
2. Id.
3. See id. The Twenty-First Council is the current Council, as of the publication of this article.
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the Navajo Nation before realizing the obstacles of inadequately paved
roads and the lack of electricity, water, and telecommunication services, not
to mention limited police and fire protection.4

This statement reflects the Navajo Nation Council’s goal of reducing unemployment and poverty through legislative efforts to attract businesses to the Navajo
Nation, despite the challenges arising from a lack of infrastructure. The Navajo
Nation’s executive branch has a similar goal and perspective regarding the Nation’s infrastructure. The website of the Navajo Nation Division of Economic Development, a department within the executive branch, states:
The main purpose of this Division is to create an environment that is conducive to promoting and developing businesses . . . thereby creating jobs
and business opportunities. . . .
. . . .
Our Mission is based on the following objectives:
• To create employment for the Navajo people and business opportunities by promoting commercial, industrial, tourism, and other private sector business development.
• To enhance economic development on the Navajo Nation and to create a positive business environment.5

The site also notes, “The Navajo Nation has a mix of urban growth centers with
infrastructure in place and vast acreage of undeveloped land. In this vast acreage,
the lack of infrastructure is a major challenge for the development of the Navajo
economy.”6
Although the foregoing statements of the Navajo Nation Council and the Division of Economic Development highlight the Navajo Nation government’s current
approach to solving the unemployment problem through economic development
and by attracting employers to the Navajo Nation, for years the government has
taken an employee-rights approach to addressing the unemployment problem. In
1985, the Navajo Nation enacted the Navajo Preference in Employment Act (Act
or NPEA),7 which created wide-sweeping rights for Navajo workers. This was done
for the laudable purposes of creating employment opportunities for Navajos, decreasing the Navajo Nation’s dependence on off-reservation sources of employment, and bolstering the economic self-sufficiency of Navajo families.8
Since 1985, the Act has evolved through legislative amendments and judicial
interpretation and its impact on employers and employees has been felt through

4. Id.
5. Navajo Nation Division of Economic Development, Our Organization and Its Mission, http://www.
navajobusiness.com/about/Mission.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
6. Navajo Nation Division of Economic Development, All Roads Lead to Navajo, http://www.
navajobusiness.com/infrastructure/index.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
7. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 15, §§ 601–619 (2005). The Navajo Nation Code is hereinafter cited as
“____ N.N.C. § ____,” in accordance with citation instructions set forth in the Code itself. All references to the
Code are to the 2005 edition, unless otherwise stated in the citation. Navajo Nation court opinions are cited in
accordance with the Navajo Nation Supreme Court’s Order Establishing a Uniform Citation System for Opinions, as set forth in In re a Universal Citation System for the Decisions of the Courts of the Navajo Nation, No.
SC-SP-01-00, slip op. at 1–2 (Nav. Sup. Ct. January 23, 2004).
8. See 15 N.N.C. § 602.
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countless administrative decisions.9 Unfortunately, despite (or perhaps because of)
years of evolution, the Act has been the source of costly and time-consuming employment-related litigation within the courts of the Navajo Nation10 and the federal
judicial system.11 The litigation often results from employers’ lack of knowledge of
the Act’s requirements, employers’ refusal to comply with the Act, and employers
contesting the Navajo Nation’s power to regulate their employment activities, and
employees’ unrealistic expectations about the Act’s protections.
There is no shortage of willing and able employees on the Navajo Nation. Unfortunately, there is also no shortage of time-consuming and expensive employment-related litigation.12 This type of litigation, regardless of whether the case-bycase results tend to favor employers or employees, can only serve as a deterrent for
businesses that might otherwise be eager to avail themselves of the many opportunities to conduct operations on the Navajo Nation. Potential employers may be
reluctant to locate their operations on the Navajo Nation because of the volume
and cost of litigation arising from the Act, the fear (whether justified or not) that
the Act is interpreted and applied too severely and in a manner that is hostile to
employers’ interests, and the resulting uncertainties about the employer/employee
relationship on the Navajo Nation.
In 2000, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court recognized this reality when it wrote
in one of its published opinions, “We are mindful of the economic impact of our
interpretive rulings of the NPEA. Interpreted too strictly, the NPEA might discourage business owners and employers from locating their operations on the Navajo Nation.”13 In this brief, but profound statement, the highest court of the Navajo
Nation signaled the need for the government to strike a reasonable, pragmatic
balance between (1) honoring and safeguarding employee rights under the Act and
(2) establishing a system of laws that creates a positive business environment that
is not overburdened with litigation and which provides employers with the certainty that they need to justify their business risks. When this balance is reached,
employers will be more apt to locate their operations on the Navajo Nation, prosper, and thereby generate employment opportunities for Navajo workers.14

9. As will be discussed in Parts III and IV of this article, the codification, interpretation, and application of Navajo preference in employment dates back many years (including the creation in 1972 of the Office
of Navajo Labor Relations, see Record of the Navajo Tribal Council 70 (Jan. 19, 1972)), and is continually
undergoing changes through agency application and court interpretation.
10. In 2007, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court published twenty opinions. Of those, approximately
one-third arose from the NPEA. See generally Navajo Nation Supreme Court Opinions, http://www.
navajocourts.org/suctopinions.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
11. See, e.g., Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. (Dawavendewa I),
154 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 1998).
12. See Manygoats v. Cameron Trading Post, 8 Nav. R. 3, 18 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2000) (“The affect [sic.] of
official action upon the interests of employers is obvious. It is common knowledge in business and legal communities that there is a great deal of employment litigation and that such litigation is expensive.”).
13. Dilcon Navajo Westerner/True Value Store v. Jensen, 8 Nav. R. 28, 40 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2000).
14. The Navajo Nation Supreme Court has acknowledged that, in deciding employment cases under
the NPEA, it is appropriate to consider the government’s official support for economic development. See
Manygoats, 8 Nav. R. at 19 (“[W]e have heard numerous public statements and policy declarations by the
Navajo Nation Council and the Navajo Nation President calling for economic development, and that means
that we are guided by concrete statements that employers should be attracted to the Navajo Nation.”).
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The year 2010 is the twenty-fifth anniversary of the NPEA. This quarter-century
mark will give employers, employees, attorneys, and Navajo Nation leaders an opportunity to reflect upon the NPEA and to consider its successes as well as areas in
which the law can be improved. This article aims to contribute to those reflections
by providing an overview and analysis of the history, purposes, application, and
interpretation of the Act. The article also provides practical guidance to assist employers in complying with the Act and proposes several legislative changes to the
Act.
Part II of this article provides a brief profile of the Navajo Nation in order to
create a context for the subsequent discussion about the Act. Part III discusses the
legislative history and purposes of the Act. In Part IV, the article delves into the
rights and obligations created by the Act by explaining the types of employers and
employees who are covered by the Act, the specific requirements of the Act, and
the manner by which the Navajo Nation monitors and enforces compliance with
the Act. Part V of the article describes the increasingly important topic of applying
Navajo customary law, or traditional law, to issues that arise under the Act. Part
VI provides a brief discussion regarding federal courts’ perspectives on the legality
of the Act’s tribal preference provisions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.
Poverty and unemployment do not need to be, and should not be, “Permanent
Issues” on the Navajo Nation. The authors hope that this article will contribute to
the ongoing discussion about turning these permanent issues into past issues.
II. INDIAN NATION SELF-GOVERNMENT AND THE NAVAJO NATION
Powers of self-government vested in Indian Nations, such as the Navajo Nation,
“are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but
rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.”15 To simplify an extremely complex jurisdictional maze, Indian Nation
governments have the power to regulate and tax their members and, in certain
cases, nonmembers who are engaged in activities within the Indian Nation’s geographical boundaries.16 Indian Nation courts exercise criminal and civil jurisdiction
over persons and claims that affect their Nations’ interests.17 In this fashion, Indian
Nations exert their sovereign powers of self-government over a broad range of
persons (including employers and employees) and subject matters (including the
employer/employee relationship).
The Navajo Nation consists of over 25,000 square miles, or 16.2 million acres, of
often isolated, rugged, and scenic land in northeastern Arizona, northwestern New
Mexico, and southeastern Utah.18 The Navajo Nation government is headquartered in Window Rock, Arizona.
“The Navajo Nation government is comprised of three co-equal branches, each
with its own area of responsibility and limitations of power.”19 The executive
branch is headed by an elected President and Vice President. The legislative
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1942) (emphasis omitted).
WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 277–81, 294–300 (4th ed. 2004).
Id. at 170–78, 199–216.
The Official Website of the 21st Navajo Nation Council, Navajo Nation Profile, supra note 1.
Tuba City Judicial Dist. v. Sloan, 8 Nav. R. 159, 166 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2001).
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branch currently consists of eighty-eight popularly elected members. The Council
members are divided into twelve standing committees. The judicial branch consists
of multiple district and family courts and one appellate court known as the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court.20 All Navajo Nation district and family courts include a
Peacemaking Program, a dispute resolution system grounded in Navajo traditions
and fundamental law.21
III. INTRODUCTION TO THE NAVAJO PREFERENCE IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT
A. The Act’s Legislative History
Navajo Nation leaders have, for many years, recognized that the Nation’s power
of self-government includes the responsibility to regulate the employer/employee
relationship. A recent opinion of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court illustrates the
importance and nature of this responsibility:
The government . . . must protect all persons within the Nation, through,
among other things, regulating the relationship between employers and employees. Through employment, the people, both employees and business
owners, provide for themselves and their families, and such employment
assists them in living a good life. Because employment is central to living a
good life, in that it provides for the well being of the people, the duty and
authority to legislate or regulate for the protection of employees and employers cannot be delegated. . . . The trust placed with the [Navajo Nation] Council to protect employment relationships through laws and
regulations cannot be handed over . . . that would be a betrayal of the
trust.22

The Navajo Nation Council has given teeth to this trust responsibility through
specific legislative efforts. In January 1972, the Navajo Tribal Council (as it was
then known) debated and ultimately passed a resolution establishing the Office of
Navajo Labor Relations (ONLR) and adopting the ONLR’s Plan of Operation.23
A reading of the transcripts of the Council’s debates on January 19, 1972, reveal
that, in discussing the ONLR and its Plan of Operation, the Council was most
concerned about two matters. First and foremost, the Council members were concerned that employers who had contracts with the Navajo Nation, particularly
large, industrial employers such as the Navajo Generating Station near Page, Arizona, were not complying with the Nation’s hiring policies and guidelines, including the granting of preference to Navajos.24 Second, Council members expressed

20. The Official Website of the 21st Navajo Nation Council, Navajo Nation Profile, supra note 1; see
also The District and Family Courts of the Navajo Nation, http://www.navajocourts.org/indexdistct.htm (last
visited Apr. 16, 2010); The Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation, http://www.navajocourts.org/indexsuct.htm
(last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
21. See generally The Navajo Nation Peacemaking Program, http://www.navajocourts.org/indexpeace
making.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
22. Thinn v. Navajo Generating Station, Nos. SC-CV-25-06 & SC-CV-26-06, slip op. at 8–9 (Nav. Sup.
Ct. October 19, 2007).
23. See Record of the Navajo Tribal Council 42–70 (Jan. 19, 1972).
24. See, e.g., id. at 42, 51. Council Member Carl Todacheene stated, in relevant part, “[T]he owners are
not complying with some of our contracts with them when it comes to employment.” Id. at 42. Council Mem-
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frustration with labor unions which they perceived were failing to safeguard the
rights and privileges of Navajo workers.25
The resolution that was being debated that day addressed these concerns in its
background “whereas” provisions:
1. It is in the best interest of the Navajo Nation and the Navajo people
that Navajo Indians living within or near the boundaries of the Navajo Nation should be given preference in employment with all enterprises, businesses and projects operated or undertaken within the Navajo Nation, and
2. Although contracts between the Navajo Nation and employers doing
business or engaging in enterprises or projects within the Navajo Nation
have provided that Navajo Indians living within or near the Navajo Nation
should be given preference in employment, such contract provisions have
proved difficult to enforce, and
3. Many employers doing business or engaging in enterprises or projects
within the Navajo Nation have not given preferential treatment to the hiring of Navajo Indians who reside within or near the Navajo Nation, and
4. Full realization of preferential treatment of Navajo Indians in employment with all enterprises, businesses and projects undertaken within the
Navajo Nation may require that employers doing business within the Navajo Nation be required to use hiring facilities established within the Navajo
Nation, and
5. Workers familiar with employment practices within the Navajo Nation
consider the establishment of an office [sic] of Navajo Labor Relations desirable and necessary to bring about preferential and full employment of
Navajo Indians. . . .26

ber Howard Gorman commented, “I would also like to say that the job that’s going on at Page, we know quite
a bit about it. . . . I understand that there are about 1,000 workers working there of different nationalities.
Out of 1,000, there are about 225 Navajos.” Id. at 51. Council Member Harry Sloan stated, “I think the coming
of industrialization on the Reservation is too enormous . . . to ignore” and that “it will be our main economy
in the future.” Id. at 62.
25. See, e.g., id. at 56–59. Council Member Carl Todacheene stated, in relevant part, “There’s a vacuum
here when it comes to organized labor. . . . As long as we have this vacuum we’re going to have to continuously deal with the problems of having the union reaching over our Reservation and manipulating the hiring
practices.” Id. at 42. Later in the debate, Mr. Todacheene stated, “We cannot forever just complain and do
nothing and leave our people at the mercy of what we call unions and our employers because we have no
regulations, we have no agency which will take care of this thing.” Id. at 56–57. Council Member Dudley
Yazzie also gave voice to such concerns, stating:
In the beginning, since we had no proper communication, we had not cooperated with
the union people, with the development of industries on the Reservation and we had not
virtually accepted unionization on the Reservation. At the onset of the industries, we began
to have labor problems with these unions by not allowing our people to be accepted, particularly in the Page area, causing our own people who are working in these areas to voice
their opinion in [objection] to the union because of the ill-treatment they were
receiving. . . .
. . . .
So, with this, the Federal Government did state that this was the first time that a certain
Indian group had begun to protest the ill-treatment of the Labor Union.
Id. at 59. Shortly before the Council voted on and adopted the legislation, Council Member Raymond Smith
commented, “Of course, the overall intent appears to be designed to take care of the acute problem and
situation we are experiencing with the Labor Union.” Id. at 67.
26. Id. at 63–64.
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The resolution’s substantive provisions stated, “1. The Navajo Tribal Council
hereby creates and establishes an organization to be known as the Office of Navajo
Labor Relations. 2. The attached Plan of Operation for the Office of Navajo Labor
Relations is hereby approved and adopted. . . .”27 The ONLR’s original Plan of
Operation stated that the ONLR’s purpose included the establishment of
[N]ew and more effective ways to reduce unemployment, through the realization of preferential treatment of Navajo Indians in employment within all
enterprises, businesses and projects undertaken within or near the Navajo
Nation and through greater coordination of training programs, hiring halls
and organizations and agencies responsible for employment and employment opportunities for members of the Navajo Nation.28

The Plan of Operation established a five-member governing Board of Directors for
the ONLR and enumerated ten duties and responsibilities of the Board.29 Essentially, the Board was charged with the responsibility of ensuring that employers
doing business within the Navajo Nation give preference to “Navajo Indians who
reside within or near the Navajo Nation,” establishing hiring halls, enforcing contract provisions that require Navajo preference, establishing and coordinating education and training programs, reviewing and approving all agreements between the
Navajo Nation and employers, and hearing complaints concerning the failure of
any employer to comply with the Navajo Nation’s preferential hiring requirements.30 Ultimately, the Council voted forty-three in favor and two opposed,
thereby passing the Resolution, creating the ONLR and adopting the ONLR’s
Plan of Operation.31
In August 1985, the Navajo Tribal Council once again considered the issue of
Navajo employment preference and debated new legislation (NPEA), to address a
myriad of preference-related issues.32 On August 1, 1985, Stanley Yazzie, Chairman of the Labor and Manpower Committee, which developed the proposed new
legislation, described efforts to establish a more comprehensive employment law
to strengthen the principles and implementation of Navajo preference. He made
the following introductory remarks to the Tribal Council:
The proposed Navajo Preference in Employment Act has been worked on
by the Labor and Manpower Committee and also the Navajo Labor Investigative Task Force, also the Office of Labor Relations Board [sic]. What
lead to the Navajo Preference in Employment Act has been the concerns
that have been expressed by Navajo workers across the Reservation. Pursuant to that, the Office of the Chairman [of the Navajo Nation], Mr. [Peterson] Zah established the Navajo Investigative Task Force on September 30,
1983. The Task Force thereafter has conducted many hearings; they have
conducted hearings, meeting with employees as well as the management of
[Arizona Public Service], Salt River [power plant] in Page[, Arizona],

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 64.
Id. at 65.
See id. at 65–67.
Id. at 66–67.
Id. at 70.
See Record of the Navajo Tribal Council 1036–59 (Aug. 1, 1985).
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Peabody [mining company], both Pittsburg and McKinley Mines, Navajo
Communications and also the staff of Navajo Labor Relations, the compliance officers. On December of 1984, we submitted the report of our mission, our findings and then thereafter the recommendation for action. . . .
The new proposed Navajo Employment Preference Law will: 1) clarify
and strengthen the preference laws in employment; 2) it will apply to such
areas as recruitment, hiring, promotions, transfers, training, and/or layoffs;
3) it will require specific affirmative action to recruit and employ the
Navajos. . . . [I]t will establish minimum qualification standards, that is the
Navajo who meets the minimum job requirements will be considered
qualified.
Finally, [the new law will] clarify the Board’s role and ONLR’s monitoring and enforcement; all employers will be subject to the law. . . .
I think with the prevalence of unfair labor practices at major employment sites . . . I think its [sic] most appropriate to support and approve
this proposed Navajo Preference in Employment Act.33

After a reading of the proposed new law, the Council debated and discussed
issues such as the problem of employers who exercise “favoritism at the local
level,”34 the question of how the law would apply to subcontractors,35 and how
Navajo preference would apply to state-funded public school districts.36 Eventually, the Council voted sixty-three in favor and zero opposed to adopt the Act.37
The Navajo Nation Council amended the Act in 1990.38 On October 15, 1990, in
his State of the Navajo Nation Address to the Navajo Nation Council (as the legislative body had become and is now known), then Interim Navajo Nation President,
Leonard Haskie, emphasized the need for the amendments:
Another important issue I would like to address are [sic] the amendments
to the Navajo Preference in Employment Act. These amendments are
based on four years of hard work by the Navajo Labor Investigative Task
Force. . . . While the amendments do not cover any new territory, they
strengthen and fortify the established employment preference rights of the
Navajo people and will ensure that our people have maximum opportunity
to acquire jobs in our own Nation.39
33. Id. at 1048.
34. See id. at 1049, 1053. Council Member Dudley Yazzie described localism through a presumably
hypothetical example of a local politician “who displays favoritism in recruiting and hiring individuals . . . who are either relatives or friends while at the same time other people in the community also want an
opportunity to work and are not given that opportunity.” Id. at 1049.
35. See id. at 1050–51, 1053.
36. See id. at 1051–52, 1054–55.
37. See id. at 1059.
38. See Record of the Navajo Nation Council 28 (Oct. 25, 1990).
39. Leonard Haskie, Interim President, Navajo Nation, State of the Navajo Nation Address to the
Navajo Nation Council 14 (Oct. 15, 1990) (excerpts on file with Howard L. Brown). The Navajo Labor Investigative Task Force (Task Force) was established in September 1983, reactivated by Executive Order dated
February 29, 1986, and reactivated again by Executive Order dated November 17, 1989 (1989 Executive Order). NAVAJO LABOR INVESTIGATIVE TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE NAVAJO NATION COUNCIL REGARDING
THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE NAVAJO PREFERENCE IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1985 6–8 (1990) (excerpts on file with Howard L. Brown) [hereinafter TASK FORCE’S 1990 REPORT]. The 1989 Executive Order
directed the Task Force to deliberate on proposed amendments to the NPEA, hold public hearings to receive
input from Navajo people, and establish a comprehensive understanding with organized labor. See id. at 8. The
“philosophy” that guided the Task Force’s efforts included “the goal . . . to achieve higher quality and more
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On October 25, 1990, the Navajo Nation Council considered the proposed
amendments to the Act.40 Despite Interim President Haskie’s comment that the
proposed amendments did “not cover any new territory,”41 the amendments did, in
fact, add a substantial amount of legislation to the Act.42 Among other things, the
amendments created important definitions for the terms “necessary qualifications”
and “qualifications,” established specific timelines and substantive requirements
for Navajo affirmative action plans, modified the requirements for advertising vacancies when employers fill positions with current Navajo workers, established requirements for employer-sponsored cross-cultural programs, explained how
employers would implement Navajo preference, expanded the requirements for
employers to pay prevailing wages, greatly expanded the provisions dealing with
the ONLR’s monitoring and enforcement responsibilities, and empowered the
newly named Navajo Nation Labor Commission (NNLC, or Commission) to conduct hearings on alleged violations of the Act.43 In many ways, the 1990 amendments gave us the NPEA that we know today. The amendments passed by a vote
of sixty-three in favor, zero opposed, and nine abstentions.44
B. The Act’s Purposes
The NPEA, codified at title 15, sections 601–619 of the Navajo Nation Code,
was enacted “to provide employment opportunities for the Navajo work force.”45
The Act represents a broad legislative scheme for regulating employment on the
Navajo Nation, creating employment opportunities through mandatory Navajo
preference and instituting other employee rights. In enacting the NPEA, the Navajo Nation Council declared, in the text of the Act, the following purposes:
1. To provide employment opportunities for the Navajo work force;
2. To provide training for the Navajo People;
3. To promote the economic development of the Navajo Nation;

numerous employment opportunities for Navajo people within the Navajo Nation and neighboring communities” and that “employment rights must be exercised and protected in a manner which does not unduly interfere with the efficient and safe operation of business enterprises within the Navajo Nation.” Id.
It is notable that the Task Force’s efforts were focused on large industrial employers and organized labor.
For example, the Task Force reviewed “employment profiles and NPEA compliance” by “the major private
employers” on the Navajo Nation, including Salt River Project, Arizona Public Service, Peabody Western Coal
Company, Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Company and BHP/Utah International, Inc., with “particular
attention to Salt River Project/Navajo Generating Station both because it historically had the poorest record
of Navajo employment but also due to recent cooperative developments with this company.” Id. at 18. The
Task Force also reviewed employment statistics of the Navajo Forest Products Industry (a tribal enterprise that
operates a timber harvesting and lumber mill), Navajo Agricultural Products Industry (a tribal enterprise that
operates agricultural businesses), Black Mesa Pipeline, Inc., El Paso Natural Gas Company, Mobil Oil Company, Texaco U.S.A., and Phillips Petroleum Company. Id. at 27–28. The Task Force considered recommendations made by an “Industry Group” comprised of Salt River Project, Arizona Public Service, Peabody Coal
Company, Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Company, and BHP/Utah International, Inc. Id. at 37 n.45.
40. See generally Record of the Navajo Nation Council 11 (Oct. 25, 1990).
41. Haskie, supra note 39, at 14.
42. See generally Record of the Navajo Nation Council 13 (Oct. 25, 1990) (containing a reading of the
NPEA by Robert Salabye).
43. See id. app. § 3(9)–3(10).
44. See Record of the Navajo Nation Council 28 (Oct. 25, 1990).
45. 15 N.N.C. § 602(A)(1).
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4. To lessen the Navajo Nation’s dependence upon off-Reservation sources
of employment, income, goods and services;
5. To foster the economic self-sufficiency of Navajo families;
6. To protect the health, safety, and welfare of Navajo workers; and
7. To foster cooperative efforts with employers to assure expanded employment opportunities for the Navajo work force.46

The Council also declared its intent that the Act be construed and applied to
accomplish the above stated purposes,47 thus laying the foundation for future administrative and judicial interpretation and application of the Act.
IV. OBLIGATIONS AND RIGHTS CREATED BY THE NAVAJO
PREFERENCE IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
A. Employers Who Are Subject to the Act
The Act applies to any “persons, firms, associations, corporations, and the Navajo Nation and all of its agencies and instrumentalities, who engage the services of
any person for compensation, whether as employee, agent, or servant.”48 The Act
further states that it applies to “[a]ll employers doing business within the territorial
jurisdiction [or near the boundaries] of the Navajo Nation, or engaged in any contract with the Navajo Nation.”49 By its terms, the Act applies to all such employers,
regardless of the size of the employer, the nature of the employer’s business or the
number of individuals employed.50

46. Id. § 602(A)(1)–(7). Purpose number seven was added as part of the amendments to the NPEA
enacted in 1990. See generally Record of the Navajo Nation Council 13 (Oct. 25, 1990).
47. See 15 N.N.C. § 602(B).
48. Id. § 603(C).
49. Id. § 604(A). In Thinn v. Navajo Generating Station, Nos. SC-CV-25-06 & SC-CV-26-06, slip op.
(Nav. Sup. Ct. October 19, 2007), the Navajo Nation Supreme Court considered whether the NNLC had
jurisdiction over a defendant that conducted business on the Navajo Nation pursuant to a lease. Id. at 1–2.
Although the lease waived the Navajo Nation’s authority to regulate “the construction, maintenance or operation” of the defendant’s facility, it also required the defendant to give “preference in employment to qualified
local Navajos.” Id. at 2. After analyzing the lease in light of federal case law and Navajo customary law, the
court concluded that the Navajo Nation retained the authority to regulate employment at the defendant’s
facility and the NNLC had authority to hear NPEA complaints filed against the defendant. Id. at 10. The court
remanded the case to the NNLC, which set the matter for hearing. Id. at 12. The defendants then filed a
lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power
Dist. v. Lee, No. CV 08-8028-PCT-JAT, slip op. at 1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 14, 2009). The district court ruled that the
parties had to follow the dispute resolution process set forth in the lease, which required referral of the dispute
to the Secretary of the Interior. Id. at 5. The district court thus dismissed the case “in favor of the parties
proceeding before the Secretary [of the Interior].” Id. In a different case, Cedar Unified Sch. Dist. v. Navajo
Nation Labor Commission, Nos. SC-CV-53-06 & SC-CV-54-06 (Nav. Sup. Ct. November 21, 2007), the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court considered the question of whether the NNLC could hear complaints alleging wrongful
termination against Arizona public school districts that operated on the Navajo Nation pursuant to leases. Id.
at 2. The court tackled a number of legal issues, including the implications of the lessor-lessee relationship
between the Navajo Nation and the school districts. Id. at 5–6. Ultimately, the court ruled, “Absent an unmistakable waiver of the Navajo Nation’s authority to regulate employment, all lessees, including public school
districts must comply with the NPEA.” Id. at 6. Thereafter, the school districts filed a complaint in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Arizona seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and challenging the Navajo
Nation’s application of tribal law to the school districts’ personnel decisions. As of the writing of this article,
the court granted summary judgment in favor of the school districts but had not yet entered a judgment. See
Red Mesa Unified Sch. Dist. v. Yellowhair, No. CV-09-8071-PCT-PGR, 2010 WL 3855183 (D. Ariz. Sept. 28,
2010).
50. See 15 N.N.C. §§ 603(C), 604(A).
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In the case of Largo v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court was asked to determine whether the defendant company, El Paso Natural
Gas (El Paso), was an “employer” under the Act.51 El Paso did not actually hire,
supervise, or pay the employees at issue in the case.52 Rather, El Paso had contracted with other entities to engage in certain pipeline construction activities, including hiring the employees.53 El Paso merely administered testing of prospective
employees.54 The supreme court found, however, that “El Paso effectively had control over hiring by [its subcontractors] through these tests.”55 The court stated further, “[W]hile El Paso did not actually hire, supervise or pay the [employees], it
had ultimate oversight and control over their work. By virtue of retaining control
over testing, it was a gatekeeper for employment.”56 The court considered El
Paso’s control over the hiring process to be an important factor in analyzing the
“actual relations of the parties,” determining that El Paso was an agent of its subcontractors and concluding that El Paso was an “employer” for purposes of the
Act.57
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court has also addressed cases involving employers operating outside of the Navajo Nation. In Cabinets Southwest, Inc. v. Navajo
Nation Labor Commission, Cabinets Southwest, Inc. (Cabinets) entered into a
lease (through a third party) with the Navajo Nation and operated outside of the
Navajo Nation on a parcel of land owned in fee by the Navajo Nation.58 The lease
expressly provided that Cabinets would abide by all laws of the Navajo Nation and
would consent to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation.59 Finding that Cabinets was
a Navajo corporation and had consented to the jurisdiction of the Nation, the court
held:
Because of the lease, Cabinets specifically consented to the application of
the NPEA, and whether or not the parcel is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation, it is bound by that consent. Further, the Navajo
Nation has the authority to regulate Navajo corporations outside its territory. The Navajo Nation Council explicitly intended that the NPEA apply
to Navajo corporations when they have contracts with the Nation, regardless of the status of the land where the contract is to be performed.60

In Jackson v. BHP World Minerals, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court held that
jurisdiction within the Navajo Nation was proper with respect to an employer who
engaged in operations inside and outside the Navajo Nation.61 An employee had
applied for a position with the defendant mining company, was hired within the
Navajo Nation, and participated in two weeks of training within the Navajo Na-

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

7 Nav. R. 147, 149 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1995).
See id. at 147–49.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 150.
See 8 Nav. R. 435, 441 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004).
Id. at 441, 443.
Id. at 445–46.
8 Nav. R. 560, 568 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004).
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tion; additionally, the employee’s records were maintained at the company’s
human resources office that was located within the Navajo Nation.62 However, the
company assigned the employee to work at one of the company’s mines that was
located outside of the Navajo Nation.63 The employee was later terminated and
challenged the termination by filing a charge with the ONLR and then a complaint
with the NNLC.64 Upon appeal to the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, the court
considered whether jurisdiction within the Navajo Nation was appropriate by stating, “[I]f there is a ‘sufficient nexus to activity on tribal land within the Navajo
Nation, the cause of action arises there for purposes of the Navajo Nation’s jurisdiction.’”65 Analyzing the “nexus” question, the court reasoned:
Necessary elements to create an employment relationship, hiring and training, occurred within the Navajo Nation. Even though [the employer] ultimately assigned [the employee] to a different mine [that was outside of the
Navajo Nation], the [employer’s] administration of the employment relationship remained at the human resources and records office within the Nation. Under these facts, there is a sufficient nexus to activity within the
Nation, and the regulatory power of the Commission extends to the employment relationship between the parties.66

B. Employees Who Are Protected by the Act
The Act defines “employee” as any “individual employed by an employer.”67
Independent contractors are not covered by the Act.68 On its face, the Act gives
certain protections only to enrolled members of the Navajo Nation (such as the

62. See id. at 566.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Id. at 568 (citation omitted).
66. Id.
67. 15 N.N.C. § 603(L).
68. Etsitty v. Diné Bii Ass’n for Disabled Citizens, Inc., 8 Nav. R. 743, 749 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2005). In
reaching the conclusion that independent contractors are not covered by the Act, the court summarized portions of the legislative history of the NPEA as follows:
A review of the legislative history of the NPEA shows . . . that the Council intended
“employees” but not “independent contractors” to be covered by the act. The original
NPEA passed in 1985 included both “employee” and “independent contractor” under the
definition of “employer”. [sic.]
The term ‘employer’ . . . shall include all persons . . . who engage the services of any
person for compensation, whether as employee, agent, servant or independent contractor.
However, the Council struck the reference to independent contractors in the 1990 amendments. The task force empowered to make amendment recommendations suggested the removal of the term “independent contractor” because it believed contractors were protected
by the then-existing Navajo Nation Business Preference Law. Based on this history, we
conclude there is a distinction recognized by the Navajo Nation Council, and therefore this
Court, between “employees” and “independent contractors.” Further, independent contractors are not covered by the NPEA.
Id. at 748–49 (citations omitted). The court’s opinion in Etsitty is also significant for its discussion of the wellestablished “control test” for determining whether an individual is truly an independent contractor. See id. at
749–51. The court adopted the control test as set forth in Restatement (Second) of Agency, but added “several
other factors to the analysis.” Id. at 750. The court also cautioned that the NNLC “must be careful not to
encourage employers to attempt to circumvent the protections of the NPEA by simply classifying whole
groups of workers as ‘independent contractors.’” Id. at 751.
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right to be terminated only for just cause),69 some protections to non-Navajo
spouses of Navajos (the right to secondary preference in employment),70 and some
protections to all employees working for employers on the Navajo Nation (the
right to a workplace free from harassment).71 As written, the Act provides that
only Navajos can file charges with the ONLR claiming a violation of their rights
under the Act.72 In a 2000 case, however, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court expanded the enforcement provisions of the NPEA to provide that any person alleging a violation of the Act may file charges with the ONLR.73
Specifically, in Staff Relief, Inc. v. Polacca, Delmar Ray Polacca, a member of
the Hopi Tribe, was offered an employment position by Staff Relief, Inc., but the
offer was later withdrawn.74 Mr. Polacca filed a charge with the ONLR and later a
complaint with the NNLC.75 One issue on appeal was whether Mr. Polacca—as a
Hopi—had the right to file a complaint under the Act.76 The Navajo Nation Supreme Court held that Mr. Polacca did have a right to file a complaint.77 The court
stated:
For reasons beyond the knowledge of this Court, the drafter of the Navajo
Preference in Employment Act . . . provided that only Navajos could file
labor complaints with the Commission.
We rectify this shortcoming by ruling that under basic principles of equal
protection of law, any person who is injured by a violation of NPEA may
file a claim with the Commission. . . . As such, [the NPEA] must be read
to protect all employees within the Navajo Nation where NPEA provides
protection in employment.78

After Staff Relief, the Act must be read to apply to “all employees” with respect
to the right to file complaints with the ONLR and NNLC, as well as any other
provisions of the Act dealing with “protection in employment.”79 In the subsequent case of Manygoats v. Atkinson Trading Co., the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court further clarified the impact of Staff Relief by expressly stating that “nonNavajos are entitled to the NPEA’s written notification and just cause for termination protections.”80 Presumably, the Act’s provisions regarding the employer’s obligation to provide a safe and clean working environment that is free of prejudice,
intimidation, and harassment would also protect non-Navajos.81 It can be inferred,
however, that only Navajos (and spouses of Navajos) enjoy the privilege of em-

69. See 15 N.N.C. § 604(B)(8).
70. See id. § 614.
71. See id. § 604(B)(9).
72. See id. § 610(B)(1).
73. See Staff Relief, Inc. v. Polacca, 8 Nav. R. 49, 56 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2000).
74. See id. at 55.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 55–56.
77. See id. at 56.
78. Id. at 56–57.
79. See id.; see also Manygoats v. Atkinson Trading Co. (Manygoats II), 8 Nav. R. 321, 335 (Nav. Sup.
Ct. 2003) (noting that “non-Navajos are entitled to the NPEA’s written notification and just cause for termination protections”).
80. Manygoats II, 8 Nav. R. at 335.
81. See 15 N.N.C. § 604(B)(9).
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ployment preference, as it would contravene logic and the policy of the Act for
such preference provisions to apply to all persons or all employees.82
C. The Act’s Substantive Requirements
The Act requires that all employers must:
(1) Give preference in employment to Navajos83 and, in certain cases, to spouses
of Navajos.84
(2) File a written Navajo affirmative action plan with the ONLR.85
(3) Include and specify a Navajo employment preference policy statement in job
announcements, advertisements, and employer policies.86
(4) Post in a conspicuous place on the employer’s premises for its employees
and applicants a Navajo preference policy notice prepared by the ONLR.87
(5) Modify all seniority systems so that they comply with the Act.88
(6) Utilize Navajo Nation employment sources and job services for employee
recruitment and referrals, except when a current Navajo employee is selected
for the position.89
(7) Advertise and announce all job vacancies in at least one newspaper and
radio station serving the Navajo Nation, except when a current Navajo employee is selected for the position.90
(8) Use non-discriminatory job qualifications and selection criteria in
employment.91
(9) Not penalize, discipline, discharge, or take any adverse action against any
employee without just cause and written notice citing such cause.92
(10) Maintain a safe and clean working environment and provide employment
conditions that are free of prejudice, intimidation, and harassment.93
(11) Provide training as a part of its affirmative action plans or activities for
Navajo preference in employment.94
82. In certain circumstances involving contracts with the federal government, the Act provides that
“Indian preference” may be substituted for Navajo preference. Id. § 604(B)(4). In those circumstances, the
preference provisions of the Act would apply to all Indians (regardless of tribal affiliation) rather than exclusively Navajos. See id. The issue of Navajo preference, as opposed to Indian preference, is discussed in Part VI
of this article.
83. Id. § 604(A)(1).
84. See id. § 614. In certain circumstances, “Indian preference” can be substituted for Navajo preference. See supra note 82.
85. See 15 N.N.C. § 604(A)(2).
86. Id. § 604(B)(1).
87. Id. § 604(B)(2). The ONLR notice, which is captioned “Notice of the Navajo Labor Laws,” summarizes the Act by stating that it requires all employers doing business within the Navajo Nation or engaged in
any contracts with the Navajo Nation to give preference in employment to enrolled members of the Navajo
Nation and to submit an affirmative action plan. It specifies that Navajo preference applies to hiring, promotion, transfers, training, termination, reductions-in-force, recalls, and recruitment. It also provides contact information for the ONLR.
88. See id. § 604(B)(3).
89. Id. § 604(B)(5).
90. Id. § 604(B)(6).
91. Id. § 604(B)(7).
92. Id. § 604(B)(8). Certain Navajo Nation employees are exempt from this provision. See infra note
158.
93. Id. § 604(B)(9).
94. Id. § 604(B)(10).

R
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(12) Provide cross-cultural programs as part of its affirmative action plans, focusing on the education of non-Navajo employees regarding the cultural or religious traditions or beliefs of Navajos.95
(13) Ensure that fringe benefit plans, sick leave programs, and other personnel
policies do not discriminate against Navajos in terms or coverage as a result of
Navajo cultural or religious traditions or beliefs.96
(14) Establish written necessary qualifications for each employment position in
the work force, and provide a copy of the qualifications to all applicants when
they express an interest in the position.97
1. Preference in Employment for Navajos and Non-Navajo Spouses of
Navajos
At the heart of the Act is its requirement that employers give preference in
employment to Navajos98 and, in certain cases, to spouses of Navajos.99 The Act
explains further the meaning of this preference. Irrespective of the qualifications
of any non-Navajo applicant, a Navajo applicant who demonstrates the necessary
qualifications for an employment position must be selected by the employer for
hiring, promotion, transfer, upgrading, recall, and other employment opportunities.100 Among a pool of applicants who are solely Navajo and who all meet the
necessary qualifications, the Navajo with the best qualifications must be selected
or retained.101 Likewise, a Navajo employee who demonstrates the necessary qualifications for a position must be retained in the case of a reduction-in-force until all
non-Navajos are laid-off.102 Any Navajo who is laid-off has the right to displace a
non-Navajo in any other employment position for which the Navajo is qualified.103
When a non-Navajo is legally married to a Navajo (and can provide proof in the
form of a valid marriage certificate), he or she is entitled to employment preference, so long as the non-Navajo spouse has resided within the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation for a continuous one-year period immediately preceding
the employment consideration.104 This preference is secondary in that it merely
provides the non-Navajo spouse with preference over other non-Navajos.105 The
non-Navajo spouse does not have preference over Navajo applicants.106
2. The Special Case for Schools: Preference in Employment for School
Employees and a Possible Model for Waivers
In 2005, the Navajo Nation Council passed, and the Navajo Nation President
signed into law, the Navajo Sovereignty in Education Act, which, in relevant part,

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. § 604(B)(11).
Id. § 604(B)(12).
Id. § 604(D).
See id. § 604(A)(1).
See id. § 614.
Id. § 604(C)(1).
Id. § 604(C)(3).
Id. § 604(C)(2).
Id.
Id. § 614(A).
See id. § 614(B).
See id.
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amended title ten of the Navajo Nation Code pertaining to education.107 For purposes of this article, the Navajo Sovereignty in Education Act is notable for its
provisions dealing with Indian preference and Navajo preference in employment.108 These provisions are significant and unique in that they elaborate on the
underlying policy supporting Navajo preference, create a separate category of Indian preference, and allow local school boards to waive these provisions by formal
vote of the board.109
As amended by the Navajo Sovereignty in Education Act, title ten, section 124
now states:
A. The ultimate goal of the Navajo Nation is self-determination. In order to
assure the survival and growth of the Navajo Nation as a people of distinct
language and culture and with a domestic economic base, the Navajo Nation requires Navajo preference in employment of school and educational
personnel in all schools serving the Navajo Nation. In addition, whenever
application of the Navajo preference policy does not result in the selection
of a Navajo applicant or candidate, a policy of Indian preference shall be
applied to the remaining applicants or candidates. . . .
B. All schools and school systems operating within the Navajo Nation shall
seek the professional services of qualified Navajo professionals as educators, counselors, administrators and support personnel to adequately serve
the linguistically and culturally unique children of the Navajo people. In
addition, all affected schools and school districts shall give preference to
Navajo personnel in providing professional training opportunities, subject
to the needs of the schools to obtain specialized training opportunities for
staff serving particular functions. In seeking educational and support personnel, schools and school districts shall include within the position description, as a preferred qualification, a knowledge and familiarity with the
Navajo language, culture and people.
C. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including the Navajo Preference in Employment Act, 15 N.N.C. § 601, et seq., as amended, the local
governing board of a school or school district may waive the requirements
of this section by a formal vote of the board. Such waiver may apply only to
individual employment, retention or promotion decisions, as determined by
the board on a case-by-case basis. In each case where a waiver of Navajo
preference-based hiring, retention or promotion occurs, the local governing
board shall make a written record of the occurrence for inclusion in the
official minutes of the board.110

Section 124 generally and subsection C in particular raise a number of important issues for school boards. First, subsection C states that, notwithstanding the
NPEA, the board is permitted to “waive the requirements of this section,” referring to the Navajo and Indian preference requirements of section 124.111 Presumably, the waiver is intended to apply not only to the preference provisions of section

107. See Navajo Sovereignty in Education Act, Navajo Nation Council Res. CJY-37-05 (July 22, 2005)
(amending titles ten and two of the Navajo Nation Code).
108. See 10 N.N.C. § 3(K), (O) (West. Supp. 2008); id. § 124.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id. § 124(C) (emphasis added).
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124, but also to the Navajo preference requirements of the NPEA. Otherwise,
school boards would not be able to exercise their power of waiver under section
124 without necessarily running afoul of the NPEA. This would be an intolerable
legal absurdity, especially in light of the fact that section 124 was adopted long
after the NPEA and should therefore be entitled to take precedence over the previously adopted, conflicting provisions of the NPEA.112 School boards (and their
attorneys) would certainly have preferred the drafters of section 124 to have
clearly enunciated their intent that boards are authorized to waive not only the
requirements of section 124, but also the similar requirements of the NPEA. For
the sake of clarity, a legislative amendment to section 124, subsection C is
advisable.
The second issue that arises under subsection C is that the first two sentences
seem to address waivers of section 124 generally.113 This implies that school boards
can waive the requirement of Navajo preference, as well as the secondary requirement of Indian preference that is mandated by section 124(A). The third sentence
of subsection C (which requires a written record of the waiver) departs from the
general language of the first two sentences and deals only with the narrower requirement of waivers of “Navajo preference-based hiring.”114 Thus, the question
arises as to whether the requirement for a written record of the waiver applies only
to waivers of Navajo preference or whether it also applies to waivers of the secondary Indian preference. Again, a clarifying amendment is advisable. In the
meantime, school boards are well-served to assume that the written record requirement applies to all waivers, and thus take the conservative approach of making a written record of all waivers, including waivers of Indian preference.
The third issue that arises under subsection C is that although boards must
make a “written record of the occurrence” of the waiver “for inclusion in the official minutes of the board,” there is no requirement that boards provide a justification or reason for granting the waiver.115 Obviously, if a school board’s decision to
waive preference is challenged or litigated, the board would be better positioned to
defend its decision with a written record of the well-reasoned and thoroughly documented justification for the waiver. As such, although not required by the statutory language, boards are advised to include in their written record of the waiver a
detailed explanation to justify the waiver.116
The fourth issue that arises under this statute is enforcement. Namely, the statute is silent with respect to whether the ONLR is authorized to monitor and enforce the Navajo and Indian preference provisions of section 124; whether the
NNLC is authorized to conduct hearings regarding alleged violations of these pro112. Relevant to this conclusion are the doctrines of lex posterior derogat priori (a later statute takes
away the effect of a prior one), see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 995–96 (9th ed. 2009), and lex specialis derogat
legi generali (a statute governing a specific matter controls over a statute governing a more general matter).
113. See 10 N.N.C. § 124(C) (West Supp. 2008).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. A school board that is considering waiving preference under this section should review the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court’s discussion in Thinn v. Navajo Generating Station, Nos. SC-CV-25-06 & SC-CV-26-06,
slip op. at 7–9 (Nav. Sup. Ct. October 19, 2007), regarding the interplay between waivers and Navajo fundamental law. Although the issues in Thinn did not arise from or address the Navajo Sovereignty in Education
Act, the court’s decision regarding waivers is informative. The relevant portions of Thinn are discussed in
more detail below. See infra notes 318–323 and accompanying text.
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visions; whether an aggrieved individual has a cause of action or administrative
remedy against schools that have allegedly violated the requirements of Navajo
and Indian preference under section 124; and, assuming there is such a cause of
action or administrative remedy, how an aggrieved individual may pursue a
claim.117
Section 124 of the Navajo Sovereignty in Education Act is significant for another reason. Namely, schools that waive preference requirements pursuant to section 124(C) are laboratories for determining whether the NPEA should be
amended to allow waivers by other types of employers. If section 124(C) has a
realistic chance of being a model for waiver provisions for other types of employers, schools must be able to show that they are not abusing their unique privilege
to waive preference, such as using waivers for purely political ends or to avoid
hiring qualified Navajo and Indian candidates. If, for example, schools use section
124(C) in an arbitrary fashion, or if empirical data shows that section 124(C) waivers result in significantly decreased employment of Navajo workers, section 124(C)
will be considered a failure. If, however, schools use the privilege of section 124(C)
waivers in a measured and reasonable manner, only when there are good reasons
to do so, and such that the rate of Navajo employment does not suffer in meaningful ways, section 124(C) will be considered successful. If proven successful, an argument can be made that section 124(C) should serve as a model for future
legislation and amendments to the NPEA allowing other types of employers to
waive preference requirements under certain circumstances.
This is not to say that employment preference requirements should be “thrown
out with the bath water.” The policy in favor of Navajo preference is sound, longstanding, and reasonable in light of the dire unemployment and economic conditions on the Navajo Nation. Waivers, however, strike a reasonable balance between promoting Navajo employment through preference requirements and
promoting Navajo employment through the expansion of employment opportunities in general. That is, waivers are undeniably “employer-friendly,” thus removing
one of the obstacles for businesses to locate to the Navajo Nation. In this regard,
the Navajo Nation Council demonstrated wisdom, insight, and a pragmatic approach to unemployment issues when it granted schools the privilege of waiver
pursuant to section 124(C). Schools now have an opportunity to seize on that privilege and prove that waivers can be used successfully and impartially, without dismantling Navajo preference and without significantly and adversely impacting
Navajo employment rates, thereby helping to make an argument that waivers are
appropriate for other employers as well.
In light of the Act’s legislative history indicating that the Act was, in large part,
a reaction to overreaching by unions and large industrial employers such as power
plants and mining companies,118 the Navajo Nation Council might begin by allowing small employers and employers engaged in specialties that directly impact
the public welfare (such as medical providers and police departments) to waive
preference requirements. Waivers could be limited to narrow sets of circumstances
117. See Navajo Sovereignty in Education Act, Navajo Nation Council Res. CJY-37-05 (July 22, 2005)
(amending titles ten and two of the Navajo Nation Code).
118. See Record of the Navajo Tribal Council 42, 51, 56–59, 62, 67 (Jan. 19, 1972); TASK FORCE’S 1990
REPORT, supra note 39, at 18, 27–28, 37 n.45.
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where employers can demonstrate and justify a need for a waiver on a case-by-case
basis, such as where there is a lack of qualified candidates or where it is essential to
hire the most qualified candidate (rather than the candidate who meets the minimum, necessary qualifications for the position). Allowing waivers under narrow
sets of circumstances such as these would preserve the primary purposes of the
NPEA while allowing employers the flexibility that they often need in making employment decisions. In turn, allowing employers a limited amount of flexibility
would advance the cause of attracting employers to the Navajo Nation while increasing the number of employment opportunities there.119
3. Necessary Qualifications Must Be in Writing, Nondiscriminatory, and
Provided to All Applicants
Under the Act, a Navajo applicant who demonstrates the “necessary qualifications” for an employment position must be selected by the employer for hiring,
promotion, transfer, upgrading, recall, and other employment opportunities.120 The
Act further mandates that employers establish written “necessary qualifications”
for each employment position in the work force and provide a copy of such qualifications to applicants at the time they express an interest in the position.121 The Act
defines “necessary qualifications” as follows:
The term “necessary qualifications” shall mean those job-related qualifications which are essential to the performance of the basic responsibilities
designated for each employment position including any essential qualifications concerning education, training, and job-related experience, but excluding any qualifications relating to ability or aptitude to perform
responsibilities in other employment positions. Demonstrated ability to
perform essential and basic responsibilities shall be deemed satisfaction of
necessary qualifications.122

The term “qualifications” is defined separately and includes “the ability to speak
and/or understand the Navajo language and familiarity with Navajo culture, customs and traditions.”123
The Act requires employers to hire Navajo applicants who demonstrate “necessary qualifications,” irrespective of the qualifications of any non-Navajo applicant.124 Based on this provision, an employer would be required to select a Navajo
applicant who meets the bare minimum qualifications of the position, even if a

119. Obviously, such changes cannot be made through judicial interpretation and application of the Act,
but through specific legislation, adopted by the Navajo Nation Council and approved by the President. As the
Navajo Nation Supreme Court stated in Silentman v. Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co.:
P&M urges the court to create special exceptions because of provisions in its lease that
appear to give it greater latitude in employment decisions than other employers. However,
the Navajo Preference in Employment Act applies equally to all employers. We will not
carve out special exceptions . . . unless the Navajo Nation Council expresses clear intent
that standards are different for some and there are justifiable reasons for the action.
8 Nav. R. 306, 313 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2003) (citation omitted).
120. 15 N.N.C. § 604(C).
121. Id. § 604(D).
122. Id. § 603(I).
123. Id. § 603(J).
124. Id. § 604(C).
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non-Navajo applicant is better qualified. As such, employers should review their
written qualifications for each employment position to ensure that the listed qualifications are stringent and demanding enough so that any applicant who meets the
bare minimum qualifications will be able to perform the job and will be a satisfactory selection.
The Act also requires that employers “use non-discriminatory job qualifications
and selection criteria in employment.”125 This means that the job qualifications
must be truly related to the position and cannot be imposed merely to “filter out”
certain candidates. In order to comply with this requirement, employers should
review their position descriptions and job qualifications for each employment position and prepare a list of the essential, necessary qualifications for each position.
The qualifications must not be unnecessarily demanding or unrelated to the job
such that they could be considered discriminatory. For example, requiring janitors
to have college degrees may be deemed a discriminatory job qualification because
a college degree is not truly related to the performance of janitorial duties and the
requirement may unnecessarily and unfairly exclude persons who do not have the
socioeconomic means to obtain a college degree.
In order to meet the requirements that the necessary qualifications be written
and provided to applicants at the time they express an interest in a position,126
employers should include the qualifications in their position descriptions, give a
copy of the position description to every applicant and/or person who expresses an
interest in the position, and require that person to sign a form acknowledging receipt of the position description at the time they express an interest.127
Employers should assume that they will be bound to adhere to the list of qualifications once that list is distributed to applicants.128 As such, employers should
make sure that their list of qualifications is comprehensive. Employers should not
expect that they will be permitted to add or modify qualifications subsequent to
providing them to one or more applicants. As a part of making sure that their
qualifications are comprehensive, employers should include any and all factors that
are considered in selecting qualified candidates, including factors that might not
otherwise be thought of as job qualifications. Many employers, for example, require background investigations and physical examinations of all candidates and
new hires. Almost all employers require the submission of applications, proof of
eligibility to work in the country, and other paperwork. Successful completion of
such investigations and examinations, as well as submission of all required
paperwork, should be treated as “necessary qualifications” for employment. The
list of qualifications should include a statement such as the following: Employment
is conditioned upon the candidate/employee’s successful completion of all interviews, background checks, fingerprint clearance requirements and physical exami-

125. Id. § 604(B)(7).
126. See id. § 604(D).
127. See, e.g., Silentman v. Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co., 8 Nav. R. 306, 312 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2003)
(agreeing with the NNLC’s finding that the employer’s written qualifications for certain employment positions
met the requirements of the Act because “[t]he duties of represented positions are defined in collective bargaining agreements, and there are written job descriptions available to applicants for all non-represented
positions”).
128. See 15 N.N.C. § 604(D).
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nations and screenings, as well as submission of all required employment-related
documents, applications, resumes, references, and forms.
If the employer does not include such a statement, it might be difficult for the
employer to exclude an applicant who fails to show up for an interview, performs
poorly in an interview, fails a fingerprint clearance requirement, fails a drug test,
receives negative references from past employers, or does not submit employmentrelated documents such as applications or proof of eligibility to work.129
Notably, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court ruled in 1995 that employers are
not required to hold positions open until unqualified Navajo applicants become
qualified.130 The court reasoned that “[i]t would be unreasonable to require a company to slow completion of its projects until unqualified Navajos gain sufficient
training to become qualified” and concluded that “[a]ll that the NPEA requires is
that, when there are a number of qualified candidates for a position, a Navajo must
be selected over a non-Navajo to fill the position.”131 This reasoning exemplifies
the court’s efforts to protect employee rights under the Act while also preserving
the employer’s ability to conduct its operations in a sound and efficient manner.
A review of NPEA-related cases reveals that the ONLR and NNLC are willing
and able to second-guess and essentially overrule an employer’s determination as
to whether an applicant meets the “necessary qualifications” of a position and
whether one Navajo applicant is more qualified than another Navajo applicant. In
Stago v. Wide Ruins Community School, the defendant school received applications from two Navajo applicants, Dr. Lula Stago and Mr. Albert Yazzie, for the
position of executive director.132 Pursuant to the Act, the school was required to
select from this pool of applicants the Navajo with the best qualifications.133 The
school reviewed each applicant’s qualifications and ultimately selected Mr. Yazzie.134 The unsuccessful candidate, Dr. Stago, filed a complaint with the NNLC
alleging that the school violated the Act by failing “to hire the best qualified Navajo for the position.”135 The NNLC agreed with Dr. Stago, effectively substituting
its judgment for the school’s regarding the qualifications of the candidates.136 How-

129. The Navajo Nation Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson v. BHP World Minerals gives tacit approval to employer statements that employment is conditioned upon the employee completing certain examinations. See 8 Nav. R. 560, 571–72 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004). In that case, the employee argued that his employer
had waived its right to terminate him because it had allowed him to begin working before he completed a
physical examination. See id. at 571. The NNLC and Navajo Nation Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the
employee “was on notice by [the employer’s] offer letter that his employment was conditioned on completing
the necessary . . . physical.” Id. at 571–72.
130. See Largo v. Gregory & Cook, 7 Nav. R. 111, 113 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1995).
131. Id. at 114–15. The Largo court further stated that, in the case that there exists a pool of qualified
Navajo applicants, the Navajo with the best qualifications must be selected. Id. at 114.
132. See 8 Nav. R. 118, 119 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2001), vacated, 8 Nav. R. 259, 268 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2002).
133. See 15 N.N.C. § 604(C)(3) (“Among a pool of applicants or candidates who are solely Navajo and
meet the necessary qualifications, the Navajo with the best qualifications shall be selected or retained, as the
case may be.”).
134. See Stago, 8 Nav. R. at 120.
135. Id.
136. Id. The NNLC awarded Dr. Stago back pay and out-of-pocket expenses in the amount of
$27,700.00, plus attorney’s fees totaling $8,633.47, and ordered the school to re-advertise the position of executive director. Id. The school appealed to the Navajo Nation Supreme Court and Dr. Stago cross appealed on
the matter of her damages. Id. On appeal, the school argued, among other things, that the NNLC should have
given deference to the school’s determination of which candidate was more qualified and that the NNLC
should not substitute its judgment for that of the school in determining who was better qualified to fill the
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ever, even though the ONLR and NNLC may second-guess an employer’s decision
regarding the applicant’s qualifications, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court has
ruled that the applicant and not the employer has the burden of showing that he or
she is actually qualified for the position in question.137
In practice, employers will sometimes “re-open” a position if they do not receive, in their judgment, enough applications from qualified candidates. Also, employers will sometimes cancel a job posting without hiring anyone because they no
longer need to fill the position or can no longer afford to fill the position, even
though they have already received applications from qualified candidates. Under
the Act, these practices are suspect. The Act states, “[A]ny Navajo applicant or
candidate who demonstrates the necessary qualifications for an employment position . . . [s]hall be selected by the employer. . . .”138 One could interpret this provision to mean that, if a qualified Navajo applies for a position, the employer must
hire that person. Under this interpretation, if an employer receives one or more
applications from qualified Navajos, the employer is prohibited from “re-opening”
the position to look for additional applicants or canceling the job posting without
hiring anyone.
To best deal with this interpretation of the Act, employers should take certain
precautionary measures. First, in their employment advertisements and postings,
employers should not state a closing date. Rather, the advertisements and postings
should state that the positions are “open until filled.” That way, the employer can
keep the position open and will not be required to “re-open” the position if the
employer wants to keep looking for qualified candidates. Second, as discussed
above, it is imperative that the written, necessary qualifications for every position
are demanding enough (but without being discriminatory) so that whoever meets
the qualifications will be able to perform the job. That way, the employer will not
be in the situation of having to hire an unqualified applicant. Third, employers
should not advertise a position until they are sure that they need to fill it and have
the funds to fill it. By following these practices, employers will not be faced with
the difficult situation of having to hire a person that they do not want or cannot
afford.
4. Affirmative Action Plans
The Act requires all employers to develop “specific Navajo affirmative action
plans and timetables for all phases of employment to achieve the Navajo Nation
goal of employing Navajos in all job classifications including supervisory and management positions.”139 The Act also requires employers to file their affirmative action plans with the ONLR within ninety days of commencing business within the

position of the school’s chief administrator. See Opening Brief of Respondent/Appellant at 38–45, Stago v.
Wide Ruins Cmty. Sch., 8 Nav. R. 118 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2001) (No. SC-CV-63-99) (on file with Howard L.
Brown). The court did not, however, reach this issue, as it decided the case on jurisdictional grounds involving
the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Stago, 8 Nav. R. at 120–21. After the Navajo Nation Supreme Court vacated
the case, the school filed an action in federal district court. See Wide Ruins Cmty. Sch., Inc. v. Stago, 281 F.
Supp. 2d 1086 (D. Ariz. 2003). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in that matter and, after
oral argument, the district court denied the school’s motion and granted Dr. Stago’s motion. Id. at 1089.
137. See Silentman v. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co., 8 Nav. R. 306, 312 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2003).
138. 15 N.N.C. § 604(C).
139. Id. § 604(A)(1).
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Navajo Nation.140 Failure to file a compliant plan constitutes a violation of the
Act.141
Upon request and subject to the availability of resources, the ONLR is required
to provide assistance to employers with respect to the development and implementation of affirmative action plans.142 Additionally, upon request, the ONLR will
review an employer’s plan and either approve or disapprove it.143 If approved, the
ONLR will not allow a charge to be filed alleging unlawful provisions or omissions
in the approved plan, except upon thirty days written notice to the employer to
allow for voluntary corrections.144 A similar grace period is allowed with respect to
allegations that a submitted plan does not conform to the Act.145
The Act specifies a number of elements that must be included in every affirmative action plan. The Act states, “Training shall be an integral part of the specific
affirmative action plans or activities for Navajo preference in employment.”146 In
addition, section 604(B)(11) of the Act states:
An employer-sponsored cross-cultural program shall be an essential part of
the affirmative action plans under the Act. Such program shall primarily
focus on the education of non-Navajo employees, including management
and supervisory personnel, regarding the cultural and religious traditions or
beliefs of Navajos and their relationship to the development of employment
policies which accommodate such traditions and beliefs. The cross-cultural
program shall be developed and implemented through a process which involves the substantial and continuing participation of an employer’s Navajo
employees, or representative employees.147

On November 22, 2002, the Human Services Committee of the Navajo Nation
Council adopted regulations that elaborate on the contents of affirmative action
plans and the implementation of those plans.148 Because of the complexity of the
affirmative action plans required by the Act and the Human Services Committee’s
Regulations, employers are advised to consult with legal counsel in developing
their plans. In summary, the regulations contain six requirements:
First, the employer must develop a policy statement that: (a) indicates the employer’s position on the subject of Navajo preference; (b) assigns responsibility for
implementing Navajo preference; (c) sets forth a procedure for reporting and monitoring Navajo preference; (d) discusses employment and training for Navajo
140. Id. § 604(A)(2); see also Milligan v. Navajo Tribal Util. Auth., No. SC-CV-31-05, slip op. at 7 (Nav.
Sup. Ct. March 23, 2006) (“Each employer within the Navajo Nation must file an affirmative action plan with
the Office of Navajo Labor Relations.”). If a labor organization represents an employer’s employees, the
employer and the labor organization must file the affirmative action plan jointly. 15 N.N.C. § 604(A)(2).
141. 15 N.N.C. § 604(A)(2).
142. Id. § 604(A)(3).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. § 604(B)(10).
147. See id. § 604(B)(11).
148. See Approving the Navajo Nation Affirmative Action Regulations as an Addendum to the Navajo
Preference in Employment Act, Navajo Nation Council Human Servs. Comm. Res. HSCN-28-02 (Nov. 22,
2002) [hereinafter Affirmative Action Regulations]. “The Human Services Committee of the Navajo Nation
Council is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the enforcement and implementation
of the provisions of [the] Act.” 15 N.N.C. § 616.
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workers; and (e) states that employment decisions and personnel actions shall be
based on the principles, intent, and purposes of the NPEA.149
Second, the employer must appoint a management-level employee with decision-making authority to implement and monitor the affirmative action plan.150
This employee’s responsibilities consist of: (a) developing the plans, “policy statements, goals and objectives, and internal and external communication procedures”; (b) identifying problems and implementing corrective solutions for
problems in providing Navajo preference; (c) designing and implementing audit
and reporting systems that measure the effectiveness of the employer’s affirmative
action plan, in order to indicate the need for remedial action when necessary and
to determine the degree to which the employer’s goals and objectives have been
met; and (d) serving as a liaison between the employer and the ONLR.151
Third, the employer must establish goals and timelines for achieving the goal of
employing Navajos in all job classifications, including supervisory and management positions.152 The goals and timelines should be attainable, based on the employer’s analysis of specific factors including the positions that are currently held
by non-Navajos, the qualifications for those positions, and timelines for Navajo
workers to become qualified for positions held by non-Navajos.153
Fourth, the affirmative action plan should contain a workforce analysis, consisting of a list of each job title, ranked from lowest paid to highest paid, within each
department, including mid-management and top-management titles, as well as
“[l]ines of progression . . . through which employees could move upward.”154 The
plan should also include an analysis of all positions and an explanation of whether
Navajos are “underutilized” in those positions, meaning that fewer Navajos are
employed in that position “than would be expected by the availability of qualified
Navajo workers.”155
Fifth, the employer must make an “in-depth analysis” of: (a) the composition of
Navajo and non-Navajo employees in its work force; (b) the “composition of applicant flow of Navajos and non-Navajos”; (c) the “[s]election process, including recruitment, job descriptions, interview criteria, written tests and final selection”;
(d) employee retention, promotions, transfers, reductions in force, and recalls;
(e) apprenticeship programs and trainings; and (f) company trainings, both formal
and informal.156
Finally, if any of the following deficiencies are identified in the analysis, a plan
of corrective action must be established immediately: (a) underutilization of Navajo employees; (b) vertical movement of Navajos occurring at a lesser rate than
that of non-Navajos; (c) a selection process that eliminates a significantly higher
percentage of Navajos than non-Navajos; (d) the employer’s position descriptions
are inaccurate in relation to actual duties and functions performed; (e) testing and
test forms that have adverse impact at a higher rate on Navajos than non-Navajos;
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See Affirmative Action Regulations, supra note 148, § II(A).
Id. § III(A).
Id. § III(A)(1)–(5).
See id. §§ I(A), IV.
Id. § IV(A)(1)–(3).
Id. § V(A).
Id. § V(B).
Id. § V(C)(1)–(6).

R
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(f) lack of support of the employer’s affirmative action plan by employees, supervisors, or managers; and (g) having no formal criteria for evaluating the effectiveness
of the affirmative action program.157
5. Termination and Other Adverse Employment Actions
Many employers and employees are accustomed to the “employment-at-will”
relationship by which either the employer or the employee can terminate the employment relationship for good reason or no reason, with or without notice (unless
a contract, personnel policy or the employer’s historical practice, for example, requires otherwise). In sharp contrast, the Act prohibits at-will employment and prohibits employers from penalizing, disciplining, discharging, or taking any adverse
action against any employee without just cause and written notice citing such
cause.158 This requirement has generated a tremendous amount of litigation under
the Act and it is therefore imperative for stakeholders to be familiar with the requirement and how the ONLR, the NNLC, and the Navajo Nation Supreme Court
have interpreted it.
a. What Is an “Adverse Action”?
The term “adverse action” is not defined in the Act. From the statutory context,
however, it can be inferred that adverse actions include employment terminations,
demotions, pay reductions, and other disciplinary actions.159 The Navajo Nation
Supreme Court has clarified that, to be considered an adverse action, the action
must have a tangible, negative effect on a person’s ongoing employment.160 Specifically, in Sells v. Rough Rock Community School, the court held:
Whether an “action” is “adverse” depends on the specific employment relationship. The Sells urge that this Court follow federal case law that defines
“adverse” in the employment context as “if it results in some tangible, negative effect on the Plaintiff’s employment.” We hereby adopt that standard
as consistent with the stated purpose of the NPEA . . . and as consistent
with Navajo Common Law. . . .161

157. Id. § V(D)(1)–(7).
158. See 15 N.N.C. § 604(B)(8); Toledo v. Bashas’ Diné Mkt., No. SC-CV-41-05, slip op. at 2, 6–7 (Nav.
Sup. Ct. August 17, 2006) (finding that the employer had complied with the NPEA by changing its at-will
employment policy); Smith v. Navajo Nation Dep’t of Head Start, 8 Nav. R. 709, 714 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2005)
(“[T]he Navajo Nation Council clearly rejected an ‘at-will’ employment system within the Navajo Nation by
requiring ‘just cause’ for termination. . . .”). Notably, an amendment to the Act passed by the Navajo Nation
Council in 1998 exempted from this provision all Navajo Nation “Division Directors [and] other employees
and officials of the Navajo Nation who serve, pursuant to a specific provision of the Navajo Nation Code, at
the pleasure of the Navajo Nation Council, the standing committees of the Navajo Nation Council, the President of the Navajo Nation, the Speaker of the Navajo Nation Council, the Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation”
and support personnel for the Speaker of the Navajo Nation Council and assistants, administrators, legal
counsel, and clerical staff hired for the President and Vice President of the Navajo Nation. 15 N.N.C.
§ 604(B)(8).
159. 15 N.N.C. § 604(B)(8) (“All employers shall not penalize, discipline, discharge nor take any adverse
action against any Navajo employee without just cause.”).
160. See Milligan v. Navajo Tribal Util. Auth., No. SC-CV-31-05, slip op. at 3 (Nav. Sup. Ct. March 23,
2006) (“[T]his Court defines ‘adverse action’ as an action ‘affecting ongoing employment’ in some ‘tangible,
negative’ way.”); Sells v. Rough Rock Cmty. Sch., 8 Nav. R. 643, 648 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2005).
161. Sells, 8 Nav. R. at 648.
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In Sells, the court also recognized an important distinction between the expiration
of term employment (which would not constitute an adverse action) and the termination of ongoing employment (which would constitute an adverse action) by stating, “[W]e add further that the ‘action’ in this context must be an affirmative act by
the employer that terminates ongoing employment.”162
In Sells and the subsequent case of Goldtooth v. Naa Tsis’ [Aan] Community
School the court elaborated on this rule to indicate that the non-renewal of a term
contract, absent a provision for automatic renewal, is not an adverse action.163 Specifically, the Sells court held, “The mere notice to an employee that a contract has
been fulfilled, in the absence of contractual language requiring automatic renewal,
though ‘adverse,’ is not ‘action’ that triggers the requirement to give written notification of ‘just cause.’”164 The court included a cautionary footnote in Sells, however, warning against an employer’s intentional use of term contracts to avoid the
“just cause” requirement of the Act, such as where an employer uses “unnecessarily short terms for the same employees in a series of contracts.”165 This is another
example of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court striking a balance between protecting employee rights under the Act and protecting the employer’s ability to operate
his or her business with a reasonable degree of flexibility. The court correctly acknowledged that the fulfillment or expiration of a term contract does not trigger
rights under the Act, but warned employers that abuse of such contracts will swing
the pendulum of the Act’s protections back to the employee. After Sells and its
progeny, it is up to employers to demonstrate that they can use term contracts
reasonably and fairly, and not to undermine the purposes of the Act.
b. What Constitutes “Just Cause”?
An employer may not take an adverse action against an employee without just
cause.166 This raises the question: What is “just cause”? In Smith v. Navajo Nation
Department of Head Start, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court wrestled with this
question and, rather than relying on one test to answer it, created what amounts to
a case-by-case analysis:
Though the Navajo Nation Council clearly rejected an “at-will” employment system within the Navajo Nation by requiring “just cause” for termination, it did not define “just cause” for this Court to apply. . . .

162. Id.
163. Id. at 648–49; see also Goldtooth v. Naa Tsis’ Cmty. Sch., 8 Nav. R. 682, 689–92 (Nav. Sup. Ct.
2005) (reasoning that if there is no contract, there is no ongoing employment, and therefore no violation of the
NPEA).
164. Sells, 8 Nav. R. at 648–49.
165. Id. at 649 n.1. In the 2009 case of Tsosie v. Central Consolidated School District No. 22, the court
addressed this question again. No. SC-CV-34-06, slip op. at 6 (Nav. Sup. Ct. August 12, 2009). The court stated
that any evidence of an employer’s intent to improperly use term contracts to avoid the just cause requirement
of the NPEA would have to be “found from the time the contract is made.” Id. The court acknowledged that
the historical use of term contracts by schools would argue in their favor and took “judicial notice that this
system of separate term contracts for administrators and teachers has been in use for many years and has been
applied by public schools on the Navajo Nation long before the enactment of the NPEA.” Id. The court
addressed the question yet again, and delivered a similar answer, in the 2010 case of Huenemann v. Ramah
Navajo School Board, Inc., No. SC-CV-48-07, slip op. at 4–5 (Nav. Sup. Ct. February 4, 2010) (mem.).
166. 15 N.N.C. § 604(B)(8).
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“Just cause” cannot be defined with any precision for all cases through
one test. “Just cause” is a broad concept that involves unique factual circumstances in each situation, and therefore must be applied based on the
unique facts of each case. The term describes “a wide range of employer
justifications for adverse actions.” Quoting from a general employment
treatise, this Court previously described “just cause” as including only “substantial misconduct,” and not “a minor neglect of duty, an excusable absence, a minor misrepresentation, rudeness, and even filing a defamation
action against the employer.”167

The following cases provide examples of fact patterns in which the NNLC or the
Navajo Nation Supreme Court determined that the employer had just cause to
take adverse employment actions against its employee. Although several of the
following cases pre-date Smith, they are instructive nonetheless.
•
In the case of Etsitty v. Sessa Corp., the NNLC found that the employer had
just cause to terminate the employee because the employee failed to report
to work for several successive days and failed to notify the employer of the
reasons for his absences.168
•
In Bitsuie v. Agent Orange Family Assistance Program, the NNLC found
that the employer had just cause to suspend the employee for insubordination and to terminate the employee for failure to comply with the terms of
the suspension.169 The employee’s act of insubordination consisted of a remark to his boss that the boss was presenting a “one man show,” followed by
a telephone conversation in which the employee stated that he “did not have
to talk to” his boss and then hung up on his boss.170 The employee’s acts of
violating the terms of his suspension included failure to turn in his keys and
returning to his office without authorization.171
•
In Rock v. Redhair, the NNLC concluded that the employer had just cause
to terminate the employee because the employee twice used the employer’s
credit card to purchase fuel for non-work related travel in her personal vehicle, in violation of the employer’s policies, and deliberately altered a credit
card receipt in an attempt to deceive the employer into authorizing the fuel
purchase.172
•
In Blie v. Peabody Western Coal Co., the NNLC determined that the employer had just cause to terminate the employee because the employee engaged in sexually harassing behavior on two occasions, despite receiving a
verbal warning that a second incident would provide grounds for termination and despite the fact that the employee was fully aware of the employer’s
sexual harassment policy.173

167. 8 Nav. R. 709, 714 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2005) (footnote and citations omitted).
168. 1 Nav. Admin. Dec. 126, 127 (N.N.L.C. 1995).
169. 1 Nav. Admin. Dec. 156, 160 (N.N.L.C. 1996).
170. Id. at 159. One must question, however, whether this act of insubordination amounted to mere
rudeness and does not constitute “substantial misconduct” under the Navajo Nation Supreme Court’s decision
in Head Start. See 8 Nav. R. at 714.
171. Bitsuie, 1 Nav. Admin. Dec. at 159.
172. See NNLC 97-011, slip op. at 6 (October 30, 1997).
173. NNLC 97-022, slip op. at 4 (January 20, 1998).
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In Yazzie v. Navajo Tribal Utility Authority, the NNLC found that the employer had just cause to terminate the employee because the employee violated the employer’s policy on alcohol use.174 The employee had violated the
policy on a previous occasion by being intoxicated while on the job.175 On
the previous occasion, the employer suspended the employee and warned
the employee that future violations could result in termination.176 When the
employee violated the policy again, he was terminated for just cause.177
In Grey v. Barlow, the NNLC concluded that the employer, a private security company, had just cause to terminate the employee, a security guard,
because the employee failed to abide by the company’s policies.178 The employee’s acts of misconduct included failing to wear the company’s uniform
while on the job, failing to wear the required number of pepper spray cans,
failing to comply with patrol procedures (such as locking doors and gates),
refusing to cooperate with co-workers, failing to be in contact with dispatchers while on duty, and sleeping on the job.179 On various occasions, the employer issued warnings to the employee, took corrective actions, and
informed the employee that continued misconduct could lead to
termination.180
In Cly v. Kayenta Trading Post, the NNLC found that the employer had just
cause to terminate the employee because the employee took twelve days of
unauthorized leave in an approximately four-month period; the employee
refused to perform assigned tasks, routinely came to work late, and left early
without authorization.181 On previous occasions, the employer gave the employee verbal and written warnings regarding his unauthorized absences.182
In Jackson v. BHP World Minerals, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court
affirmed the NNLC’s determination that the employer had just cause to terminate the employee based on substantial evidence that the employee tested
positive for marijuana.183
In Smith v. Navajo Nation Department of Head Start, the Navajo Nation
Supreme Court held that the employer had just cause to terminate an employee who had failed to call or report to a supervisor for three days in
violation of a clear rule in the employer’s personnel policies.184
In Kesoli v. Anderson Security Agency, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court
held that the employer had just cause to terminate an employee who had
engaged in a pattern of shouting at his subordinate employees, therefore
engaging in harassment of other employees.185

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

NNLC 97-026, slip op. at 4–5 (April 15, 1998).
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 3.
See id. at 4.
See NNLC 98-001, slip op. at 1–3 (April 15, 1998).
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 2.
NNLC 98-004, slip op. at 2–3 (April 13, 1998).
See id. at 3.
See 8 Nav. R. 560, 571 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004).
See 8 Nav. R. 709, 716 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2005).
See 8 Nav. R. 724, 731, 732 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2005).
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In Toledo v. Bashas’ Diné Market, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court held
that an employer had just cause to terminate an employee who had touched
another employee’s breast.186
The Toledo decision is important for another reason. In its opinion, the court
made clear that a terminated employee may rebut the employer’s just cause position by arguing that the employer did not adequately train the employee.187 Citing
an earlier case, the court stated that “ordinarily a violation of a clear rule in a
personnel manual for which termination is a result of noncompliance is ‘just
cause.’”188 Distinguishing between rules that are “clear” and those that are less
than clear, the court stated, “Generally, an ambiguous policy, in the absence of
training to inform employees of what that policy means, cannot justify termination.”189 The court acknowledged the difficulty of drafting a clear and accurate
sexual harassment policy and concluded, “All employers within the Navajo Nation
therefore must ensure proper training on their sexual harassment policy if such
policies are to be deemed reasonable notice of conduct that may cause an employee’s termination.”190 This general rule, however, is not without a “common
sense” exception.191 The court recognized that, in certain cases, the ambiguity of a
personnel policy and the lack of training on that policy is “irrelevant” and will not
result in a finding that an employer lacked just cause to take an adverse action.192
The court stated:
In the present case . . . the Court finds that the ambiguity of Bashas’
sexual harassment policy and alleged lack of training became irrelevant once Toledo admitted during the Commission hearing that he did not
need training to know that touching another employee’s breast was
“wrong.” . . . The Court finds such behavior so obviously inappropriate . . . that Bashas’ ambiguous sexual harassment policy is not implicated
in this case. Common sense indicates that Toledo’s behavior—of touching
another employee’s breast while in the workplace—was so egregious that
termination would be a likely consequence, and Toledo himself admitted as
much when he stated that he did not need training to know such behavior
was wrong.193

In light of the court’s analysis and holding in Toledo, employers are advised to
ensure training on all of their personnel policies, despite the “common sense” exception to the general rule regarding training on ambiguous policies. That way, the
employer will eliminate the need to argue and prove that a policy is clear rather
than ambiguous, that it merely prohibits “obviously inappropriate” or “egregious”
conduct, and that the employee in question did not need training to know that the
conduct was “wrong.”194

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

No. SC-CV-41-05, slip op. at 6 (Nav. Sup. Ct. August 17, 2006).
See id. at 3–5.
Id. at 4 (quoting Head Start, 8 Nav. R. at 715).
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 5–6.
See id. at 5.
Id. at 5–6.
See id. at 6.
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c. The Special Case for Layoffs: A Different Kind of Just Cause
In Milligan v. Navajo Tribal Utility Authority, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court
held that layoffs are considered adverse actions.195 The court reasoned, “A layoff
clearly affects ongoing employment in a tangible, negative way as, by definition, an
employee no longer works for the employer.”196 Also, the court stated that, because layoffs are adverse actions, they must be supported by just cause.197 Of
course, layoffs are generally the result of economic conditions or a change in an
employer’s business plan, rather than employee misconduct.198 The supreme court
acknowledged this reality in Milligan by crafting a pragmatic definition of “just
cause” that respects the rights of employees under the Act while also respecting
the employer’s need to address its business needs. The court stated:
[T]he [NNLC] must consider whether the layoff meets the substantive requirements for “just cause.” Milligan argues that a layoff decision must be
based on an employee’s “substantial misconduct,” and may not be made for
economic or other non-conduct based reasons. [The Navajo Tribal Utility
Authority] contends that Milligan’s view of “just cause” is too restrictive, as
it would prevent an employer from making decisions to eliminate positions
to better manage the business and promote its economic success.
As layoffs involve considerations different than discharges, the Court
rejects Milligan’s argument. Despite the good job performance of employees, businesses sometimes have to make adjustments to their work force to
maintain financial viability and operational efficiency. . . . The NPEA anticipates the need for employer flexibility and balances it with the rights of
Navajo workers, requiring that, when there is a “reduction in force,”
Navajos be retained until all non-Navajo workers are first “laid-off.” 15
N.N.C. § 604(C)(2) (2005). Layoffs therefore are not prohibited by the statute, but regulated to protect Navajo workers, and nothing in the act requires employers to lay off workers only for “substantial misconduct.”
The Court holds that “just cause” for layoffs does not require “substantial misconduct” of employees, but layoffs may be made when necessary to
promote financial viability or operational efficiency. However, a mere
statement by an employer that a layoff was necessary is not sufficient because the employer has the burden of proof to justify its action under the
NPEA. . . . Therefore, the [NNLC] must review the evidence presented by
the employer on the reasons for the layoff, and the employee may challenge the evidence as inaccurate or as pretext to avoid a conduct-based
termination.199

The court elaborated on the just cause requirement in the context of layoffs in a
2008 unpublished memorandum decision, Davis v. Lukachukai Community

195. No. SC-CV-31-05, slip op. at 4 (Nav. Sup. Ct. March 23, 2006).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 8–9 (“[B]usinesses sometimes have to make adjustments to their work force to maintain
financial viability and operational efficiency.”).
199. Id. at 8–9. The court acknowledged that it was creating a “new standard” that altered “the
[NNLC’s] analysis of layoffs.” Id. at 9.
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School.200 Citing Milligan, the Davis court stated, “To have ‘just cause,’ the employer, among other things, must follow its own layoff procedures. Assuming such
procedures were followed, it must also justify its layoff as necessary to promote
financial viability or operational efficiency.”201
d. Written Notice of Just Cause
As stated above, employers are prohibited from penalizing, disciplining, discharging, or taking any adverse action against any employee without just cause and
written notice citing such cause.202 The Act does not specify what must be contained in the written notice (other than an explanation of the just cause), how the
notice must be provided to the employee, or when the notice must be provided.
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court has provided some guidance in this regard. In
Smith v. Red Mesa Unified School District No. 27, the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court stated:
Our law requires employers to advise employees, in writing, of the reasons
for terminating an employee’s employment so employees may pursue their
legal remedies under the Act.
. . . .
The purposes of notice as an element of due process are to inform an
individual of the basis for adverse action and to allow that person to pursue
legal remedies with an understanding of what facts the employee must address. If the employee does not know why adverse action is taken, both due
process and the Act are violated. If, however, the employee knows the reasons for the employer’s action, in either the notice under the Act or contemporaneous documents, then due process and the Act are satisfied.203

In the subsequent case of Dilcon Navajo Westerner/True Value Store v. Jensen,
the Navajo Nation Supreme Court discussed the use of clear language in the notice
and clarified that the notice must be provided contemporaneously with the adverse
action:
In order to ensure that the purposes of the written notification requirement
are fulfilled, the notification must be meaningful. Therefore, we rule today
that the written notification must be reasonably clear in its language and
contain facts that would support the adverse action. The notice must be
provided to the employee contemporaneously with the adverse action to
guard against “ad hoc justifications.”204
200. See No. SC-CV-13-07, slip op. at 2 (Nav. Sup. Ct. October 7, 2008). Rule 22 of the Navajo Rules of
Civil Appellate Procedure explains that “[a] memorandum decision is a written disposition of a matter not
intended for publication.” N.R.C.A.P. 22(a)(2). Rule 22(c) states that memorandum decisions “shall not be
used as precedent nor cited in any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.” N.R.C.A.P. 22(c).
201. Davis, No. SC-CV-13-07, slip op. at 2.
202. 15 N.N.C. § 604(B)(8).
203. 7 Nav. R. 135, 137 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1995).
204. 8 Nav. R. 28, 39 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2000); see also Manygoats v. Atkinson Trading Co. (Manygoats II), 8
Nav. R. 321, 338 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2003) (“We previously held that the NPEA’s written notification provision
includes the requirement that notice be given at the time an employer takes an adverse action against an
employee.”). An employer is permitted to modify or amend its written notice by adding additional reasons for
the adverse action and to present evidence regarding the additional reasons in subsequent hearings as long as
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In Jackson v. BHP World Minerals, the court discussed the “meaningfulness” of
the language used in the employer’s written notice and provided examples of acceptable and unacceptable written notices:
What constitutes meaningful language in a termination notice depends
on the whole context of the employment relationship, in that the language
is designed to alert a specific employee at a specific place and time of the
reasons for the termination. In reviewing the meaningfulness of the notice,
we do not look at the bare language in a vacuum, but consider the full
interaction between the employer and employee leading up to the notice.
In Red Mesa we considered the meaningfulness of the notice in the context
of contemporaneous documents given to the employee discussing her deficiencies. As the employer had discussed the reasons it was displeased with
the employee’s work leading up to the termination, we held that the notice
was meaningful, as the employee “fully understood the basis for the [employer’s] actions and that she received fair notice of the grounds for her
eventual termination.” We contrast that situation with the one in Manygoats v. Atkinson Trading Co., where the employer merely wrote on a scrap
of paper that the employer [sic] had “violated company policies,” with no
previous notice of deficiencies or discussion about what violation of “company policies” occurred.205

In sum, the employer’s written notice of adverse action must state, in clear and
meaningful language, the adverse action being taken and the just cause supporting
the adverse action. The employer must provide sufficient, factual information to
the employee so that the employee can understand the reasons for the adverse
action and challenge the adverse action with an understanding of what facts must
be addressed. Finally, the notice must be provided to the employee contemporaneously with the adverse action.
e. Practical Suggestions for Complying with the Act’s Just Cause and
Written Notice Provisions
Reviewing NPEA case law, it is apparent that there are several precautionary
measures that employers should take to reduce the risk of incurring liability and
monetary damages under the Act’s requirements regarding just cause and written
notice. First, it is crucial that the employer document the details of each incident of
the employee’s misconduct when the misconduct occurs. In the absence of documentation, it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove that the employer had just
cause to take the adverse action.
Second, although it is not required by the Act, employers should use a system of
progressive discipline when appropriate. In the case of Red Mesa, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the Act requires that
employers use progressive discipline, such as improvement plans, before terminating an employee for unsatisfactory performance.206 As a practical matter, however,
(1) the employer did not know of the additional reasons before issuing the notice and (2) notice of the additional reasons is provided to the employee before the employee pursues her legal remedies. See Casaus v. Diné
Coll., No. SC-CV-48-05, slip op. at 6 (Nav. Sup. Ct. March 8, 2007).
205. 8 Nav. R. 560, 569–70 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004) (citations omitted).
206. Red Mesa, 7 Nav. R. at 136, 138.
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the ONLR and NNLC are more likely to find that an employer had just cause if
the employer used progressive disciplinary measures before terminating an employee.207 After all, when used properly, progressive discipline is merely another
way of providing notice of the employer’s displeasure with the employee’s work,
the employer’s expectations for future conduct, and the consequences if the employee fails to meet those expectations. Progressive discipline can also be used as a
means to train (or provide additional training for) employees on the employer’s
personnel policies. Finally, employers can use progressive discipline policies as a
“check” on their own authority, to ensure that they take adverse actions against
employees only for substantial misconduct (which may include repeated misconduct), rather than minor neglects of duty.
Third, employers should have personnel policies setting forth standards for employee conduct, consequences for violating those standards, procedures for disciplining employees when they engage in misconduct, and training strategies
pertaining to those policies.208 Additionally, employers should document that the
employees have received and understand the policies, received training on the policies, and have had an opportunity to ask questions about the policies.209 Many
employers use an “Acknowledgment Form” that is signed by the employee and
maintained in the employee’s personnel file.
Fourth, employers must apply their policies with uniformity. If two employees
commit the same infraction, the employer should discipline both employees similarly, unless the employer has non-pretextual, lawful reasons to distinguish between the employees in a manner that would justify different disciplinary actions.
6. Prohibition Against Harassment
The Act requires that “[a]ll employers shall . . . provide employment conditions which are free of prejudice, intimidation and harassment.”210 Although the

207. In several NNLC cases, employers used progressive discipline before taking adverse action against
the employee. See, e.g., Grey v. Barlow, NNLC 98-001, slip op. at 2–3 (April 15, 1998) (concluding that the
employer had just cause to terminate the employee where the employer had issued prior warnings to the
employee, took corrective actions, and informed the employee that continued misconduct could lead to termination); Yazzie v. Navajo Tribal Util. Auth., NNLC 97-026, slip op. at 3–5 (April 15, 1998) (finding that the
employer had just cause to terminate the employee where the employer had previously suspended the employee and warned the employee that future violations could result in termination); Cly v. Kayenta Trading
Post, NNLC 98-004, slip op. at 2–3 (April 13, 1998) (finding that the employer had just cause to terminate the
employee where the employer had previously given the employee verbal and written warnings regarding his
misconduct); Blie v. Peabody W. Coal Co., NNLC 97-022, slip op. at 4 (January 20, 1998) (finding that the
employer had just cause to terminate the employee where the employer had issued a prior verbal warning that
a second act of misconduct would provide grounds for termination).
208. In other cases, the adverse action was based, at least in part, on a violation of a personnel policy.
See, e.g., Smith v. Navajo Nation Dep’t of Head Start, 8 Nav. R. 709, 716 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2005) (holding that the
employer had just cause to terminate an employee who had failed to call or report to a supervisor for three
days in violation of a clear rule in the employer’s personnel policies); Grey, NNLC 98-001 slip op. at 2–3
(concluding that the employer had just cause to terminate the employee because the employee failed to abide
by the company’s policies); Navajo Tribal Util. Auth., NNLC 97-026, slip op. at 1–2, 5 (finding that the employer had just cause to terminate the employee because the employee violated the employer’s policy on
alcohol use); see also Dilcon, 8 Nav. R. at 39–40 (discussing employee manuals in the context of NPEA
actions).
209. See, e.g., Toledo v. Bashas’ Diné Mkt., No. SC-CV-41-05, slip op. at 4–5 (Nav. Sup. Ct. August 17,
2006).
210. 15 N.N.C. § 604(B)(9).
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Act does not define the term “harassment,” the Navajo Nation Supreme Court has
had multiple opportunities to consider this provision of the Act and the related
issue of sexual harassment. In Kesoli v. Anderson Security Agency, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court stated that “harassment” under the Act constitutes “just
cause” for adverse action.211 The court found that the conduct of the employee in
question, which consisted of a pattern of shouting at his subordinates was harassment, and concluded that the employer had just cause to terminate that employee.212 In reaching this conclusion, the court adopted a definition of harassment
“as a broad term encompassing all forms of conduct that unreasonably interfere
with an individual’s work performance or create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”213 In the subsequent case of Toledo v. Bashas’ Diné
Market, the court reiterated that harassment, including sexual harassment, may be
just cause for termination of an employee.214
Harassment can be just cause for termination of the harassing employee; however, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court has held that victimized employees are
not authorized to bring NPEA claims against their employers for sexual harassment committed by fellow employees. In Yazzie v. Navajo Sanitation, the court
held that “the very broad, ambiguous language in Section 604(B)(9) [of the Act]
does not authorize an employee to file a claim with the [NNLC] against an employer for sexual harassment,” particularly where the “claim of sexual harassment
[is] not tied to a disciplinary action against the employee.”215 The court stated:
The [NNLC] has jurisdiction only to hear claims arising under the NPEA,
and cannot hear other claims an employee might bring against an employer. . . . This Court has never decided whether an employer can be liable under the NPEA for an employee’s sexual harassment of another
employee under [15 N.N.C. § 604(B)(9)], though the Court has stated that
“harassment,” including sexual harassment can be “just cause” for termination of an employee.216

The court continued:
Sexual harassment is an emerging issue in Navajo society, and other societies, and what it means and whether it should be an actionable claim are
being developed. In the Navajo environment, this development is in its nascent stage. . . . Given the unsettled nature of what sexual harassment
should mean and, absent explicit language in the NPEA that sexual harassment is actionable before the [NNLC], the Court will not expand the statute to allow for claims against an employer where the Council has not
clearly provided for them. . . .
The Court’s holding does not mean that Yazzie lacks any remedy; it simply
means that he may not seek that remedy from the [NNLC].217
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
employer

See Kesoli v. Anderson Sec. Agency, 8 Nav. R. 724, 731–32 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2005).
Id.
Id. at 731 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Toledo, No. SC-CV-41-05, slip op. at 4–5.
No. SC-CV-16-06, slip op. at 2, 6–7 (Nav. Sup. Ct. July 11, 2007).
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6–7. Notably, in an unpublished memorandum decision, the supreme court indicated that an
cannot be held strictly liable for failing to provide a harassment-free environment if the employer
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As such, sexual harassment by an employee can constitute just cause for adverse
action against the harasser but does not trigger an NPEA claim by the victim of the
harassment against the employer.
7. Union Activities
The Act recognizes the right of Navajo workers “to organize, bargain collectively, strike, and peaceably picket to secure their legal rights.”218 The right to
strike and picket does not, however, apply to employees of the Navajo Nation, its
agencies, or its enterprises.219 On July 25, 1994, the Human Services Committee of
the Navajo Nation adopted regulations authorizing the ONLR to certify unions
through a petition and voting process for “employees of the Navajo Nation, its
agencies or enterprises.”220 The regulations reinforce the right of Navajo Nation
employees to form, join, or assist any labor organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining without interference, restraint, or coercion by employers or other
persons.221
8. Prevailing Wage
The Act directs the ONLR to establish a prevailing wage rate for each employee classification with respect to construction projects occurring within the
Navajo Nation.222 Certain types of construction projects, including those valued
under 20,000 dollars and those that are subject to the Davis-Bacon Act, are
exempt.223
9. Health and Safety of Workers
The Act addresses the health and safety of workers in two places. First, section
604(B)(9) states that “[a]ll employers shall maintain a safe and clean working environment.”224 Second, section 608 requires employers to “adopt and implement
work practices which conform to occupational safety and health standards imposed
by law.”225
responds to the allegations of harassment with “swift action.” Davis v. Lukachukai Cmty. Sch., No. SC-CV-1307, slip op. at 1–2 (Nav. Sup. Ct. October 7, 2008).
218. 15 N.N.C. § 606.
219. Id. § 606(A).
220. Adopting the Navajo Preference in Employment Act Regulations to Provide Rules and Enforcement Procedures to Permit Collective Bargaining for Employees of the Navajo Nation, Its Agencies or Enterprises, Navajo Nation Council Human Svcs. Comm. Res. HSCJY-63-94 (July 25, 1994).
221. See id.
222. 15 N.N.C. § 607(B).
223. Id. § 607(D). The Davis-Bacon Act:
[R]equires all contractors and subcontractors performing work on federal or District of Columbia construction contracts or federally assisted contracts in excess of $2,000 to pay their
laborers and mechanics not less than the prevailing wage rates and fringe benefits for corresponding classes of laborers and mechanics employed on similar projects in the area. The
prevailing wage rates and fringe benefits are determined by the Secretary of Labor for inclusion in covered contracts.
United States Department of Labor, Compliance Assistance by Law—The Davis-Bacon and Related Acts
(DBRA), http://www.dol.gov/compliance/laws/comp-dbra.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
224. 15 N.N.C. § 604(B)(9).
225. Id. § 608. This provision raises the question of whether the Federal Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA) applies in Indian Country. In Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1117–18
(9th Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that OSHA applied to an Indian Nation farm be-
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10. Contract Compliance
All leases, contracts, collective bargaining agreements, and other transaction
documents entered into by, or issued to, any employer and which are to be performed within the Navajo Nation must contain provisions by which the employer
and other contracting party agree to abide by all requirements of the Act.226 Similarly, every bid solicitation, request for proposals, notice, and advertisement for
contracts to be performed within the Navajo Nation must state that the contract
must be performed in compliance with the Act.227
11. Polygraph Testing
The Act prohibits any person from requesting or requiring an employee or applicant to take a polygraph test as a condition of obtaining employment or continuing employment.228 Additionally, employers are prohibited from terminating or
disciplining an employee for failing or refusing to take such a test.229 This provision
does not, however, apply to federal or state employees on the Navajo Nation.230
12. Breast-Feeding in the Workplace
In November 2008, Navajo Nation President, Dr. Joe Shirley, Jr., signed into
law the Navajo Nation Healthy Start Act of 2008 (Healthy Start Act).231 Although
the Healthy Start Act is not codified as part of the NPEA, it creates new rights for
certain employees on the Navajo Nation, incorporates certain definitions from the
NPEA, and is enforced by the ONLR and the NNLC.232
The stated purpose of the Healthy Start Act “is to provide for opportunities for
working mothers to obtain the health benefits of breast-feeding for their infant
children, themselves, and the Navajo Nation, through provision for breast-feeding
or use of a breast pump, or both, within workplaces on the Navajo Nation.”233 To
accomplish this purpose, the Healthy Start Act states, “All employers doing business within the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation, or engaged in any
contract with the Navajo Nation, shall provide to each working mother opportunities to engage in breast-feeding of their infant child, or use of a breast pump at the
workplace.”234 The Healthy Start Act continues by explaining that the employer
cause, in the court’s view, the application of OSHA to the farm would not touch upon that Indian Nation’s
exclusive rights of self-governance in purely internal matters. By contrast, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
in Donovan v. Navajo Forest Products Industries, 692 F.2d 709, 712 (10th Cir. 1982), declined to apply OSHA
to a Navajo Nation business because it concluded that such application would abrogate rights guaranteed to
the Navajo Nation by treaty.
226. 15 N.N.C. § 609(A).
227. Id. § 609(B).
228. Id. § 615(A).
229. Id.
230. See id. § 615(B).
231. See An Act Relating to the Health, Human Services, and Judiciary; Enacting the Navajo Nation
Healthy Start Act of 2008, Navajo Nation Council Res. CO-40-08 (Oct. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Healthy Start
Act].
232. See id.
233. 15 N.N.C. § 702 (West. Supp. 2008).
234. Id. § 704(A). The Healthy Start Act defines “working mother” as “an employee, as defined in the
[NPEA], at 15 N.N.C. § 603(L), who is the natural mother [and] engages in the provision of services to an
employer for compensation, whether as an employee, agent or servant.” Id. § 703(G). The Healthy Start Act
defines “infant child” as a “child between birth and the age of twelve (12) months, who is being breast-fed by a
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must provide (1) “[a] clean and private area or other enclosure near the employee’s workspace, and not a bathroom, to allow a working mother to engage in
breast-feeding or use of a breast pump” and (2) “a sufficient number of unpaid and
flexible breaks within the course of the workday to allow a working mother to
engage in breast-feeding or use of a breast pump.”235 All employers are required to
file with the ONLR a written plan by which the employer will provide working
mothers with opportunities for breast-feeding or the use of a breast pump in the
workplace.236 Employers are therefore well-served to consult with their legal counsel to prepare and adopt written policies that comply with the Healthy Start Act
and to train supervisors and other employees on those policies.
The Healthy Start Act does not contain any exceptions and does not provide a
defense for employers who claim that providing such opportunities for breast-feeding would create an undue burden on the employer due to factors such as cost or
employee scheduling needs. Notably, the Healthy Start Act states that
The failure of an employer to comply with [the Healthy Start Act] shall
be deemed to be an adverse action against the employee, a failure of the
employer to provide a safe and clean working environment, and a failure to
provide employment conditions which are free of prejudice, intimidation
and harassment, for purposes of the Navajo Preference in employment [sic]
Act, 15 N.N.C. § 604(B).237

The ONLR is empowered to monitor and enforce the Healthy Start Act and the
NNLC is authorized to conduct hearings involving allegations of violations of the
Healthy Start Act, in the same manner as set forth in the NPEA.238 Upon a finding
that an employer has violated the Healthy Start Act, the NNLC is authorized to
enter remedial orders to the same extent and in the same nature as set forth in the
NPEA.239
D. Monitoring and Enforcement of the NPEA
1. The Office of Navajo Labor Relations
“The ONLR is an administrative agency established by the Navajo Nation
Council to implement Navajo Nation labor policies, and monitor and enforce the
NPEA.”240 Any person may file a charge alleging a violation of his or her rights

working mother” and “workplace” as “the place in which a working mother engages in the provision of services to an employer for compensation, whether as an employee, agent or servant.” Id. § 703(E), (H).
235. Id. § 704(B). To the extent that the Fair Labor Standards Act applies to employers who are also
subject to the Healthy Start Act, such employers should seek legal advice as to whether breaks for breast
feeding for nonexempt employees should be paid or unpaid and whether such breaks should be counted as
hours worked.
236. Id. § 704(C).
237. Id. § 704(D).
238. Id. §§ 705–706.
239. Id. § 707.
240. PC&M Constr. Co. v. Navajo Nation, 7 Nav. R. 96, 97 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1994); see also 15 N.N.C.
§ 610(A). In Yazzie v. Tooh Dineh Industries, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court stressed that ONLR employees have an affirmative responsibility to assist individuals who seek to file complaints. No. SC-CV-67-05, slip
op. at 4–5, 6 & n.1 (Nav. Sup. Ct. September 20, 2006). The court stated that ONLR employees “are ‘gatekeepers’ upon whom the petitioner depends in order to receive the protections of the NPEA,” that “ONLR’s
responsibility mandates more than simply waiting for the employee to ask for a form that he or she may not
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under the NPEA.241 Additionally, the ONLR may, on its own initiative, file a
charge claiming a violation of rights held by an individual or a class of persons.242
All charges must be filed with the ONLR within one year after the accrual of the
claim.243 A claim accrues “on the date of the employer’s action that allegedly violated the NPEA, unless there are special circumstances where the employee was
not notified of the action, or for some other reason could not reasonably be expected to know that the action occurred.”244 Notably, “[an] employee’s voluntary
participation in an employer’s internal grievance process does not change the timing” or extend the deadlines for filing a charge.245 Within twenty days after the
charge is filed, the ONLR must notify the employer of the charge.246
The ONLR is required to “conduct such investigation of a Charge as it deems
necessary to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the Act has
been violated.”247 The ONLR may, in conducting its investigation, issue subpoenas
to produce evidence, request answers to interrogatories, and interview witnesses.248
In practice, the ONLR issues a letter to the employer describing the charge and
requesting responses to specific inquiries and copies of documents.
Within 180 days after the date on which the charge was filed, the ONLR must:
(1) dismiss the charge for (a) lack of probable cause, (b) petitioner’s failure to file
the charge within applicable time frames, or (c) petitioner’s failure to cooperate
with ONLR’s investigation or attempts to settle the matter;249 or (2) issue a “probable cause determination” identifying the employer’s violations of the Act and attempt to secure compliance and relief through a conciliation and settlement
process;250 or (3) certify that it will be unable to complete these steps within the
180-day time period.251 In any event, after the expiration of the 180-day period, the
ONLR issues a “right to sue” letter, giving the employee the right to initiate proceedings before the NNLC.252

even know exists,” and that “ONLR instead has the duty to affirmatively distribute charge forms and explain
what they mean.” Id.
241. See 15 N.N.C. § 610(B)(1); see also Staff Relief, Inc. v. Polacca, 8 Nav. R. 49, 56–57 (Nav. Sup. Ct.
2000) (expanding the enforcement provisions of the NPEA to provide that any person—not just any Navajo—
alleging a violation of the Act may file charges with the ONLR).
242. See sources cited supra note 241.
243. 15 N.N.C. § 610(B)(6); Werito v. Tuba City Unified Sch. Dist. No. 15, No. SC-CV-03-07, slip op. at
2–3 (Nav. Sup. Ct. April 6, 2009) (mem.). Notably, the NPEA requires the ONLR to dismiss any charge upon
determining that the charge was not filed within the statutory time limits, 15 N.N.C. § 610(D)(1)(b), (D)(2)(b),
and thus the ONLR is required to make findings as to whether the charge was timely filed. Werito, No. SC-CV03-07, slip op. at 2 n.2. The one-year time limitation is a nonjurisdictional statute of limitations that can be
waived and is subject to equitable tolling. See infra note 257.
244. Moore v. BHP Billiton, No. SC-CV-32-05, slip op. at 3 (Nav. Sup. Ct. May 14, 2007).
245. Id.
246. 15 N.N.C. § 610(B)(7). Notably, the Act does not provide for any remedy or relief for the employer
if the ONLR fails to provide such notice.
247. Id. § 610(C)(1).
248. Id. § 610(C)(2).
249. Id. §§ 610(H)(2), (D).
250. Id. § 610(E)–(G).
251. Id. § 610(H)(2)(a)(4).
252. Id. § 610(H)(1)(b). The procedures for processing charges brought by the ONLR on behalf of employees (as opposed to charges brought directly by employees) are included in title 15, section 610 of the
Navajo Nation Code.
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2. The Navajo Nation Labor Commission
The NNLC “is an administrative body created by the Legislative Branch of the
Navajo Nation government. Its function is to review employment claims that allege
violations of the NPEA.”253 The NNLC conducts hearings pursuant to the adjudicatory authority granted to it under the Act,254 as well as per its own rules of
procedure.255
Upon receiving a right to sue letter from the ONLR, or upon the expiration of
180 days after the employee’s charge is filed, the employee may proceed by filing a
written complaint with the NNLC.256 The complaint must be filed within 360 days
following the date on which the underlying charge was filed with the ONLR (the
filing date is that day on which the charge was signed by the ONLR director or an
ONLR employee).257 The NNLC is required to schedule a hearing within sixty days
of the filing of the complaint and deliver a notice of the hearing to the parties.258
Although the NNLC must complete the act of scheduling the hearing within sixty
days of the filing of the complaint, the hearing need not be held within those sixty
days.259 In Dilcon Navajo Westerner/True Value Store v. Jenson, the Navajo Nation
Supreme Court acknowledged that the NNLC has “flexibility in determining when
to conduct hearings” but provided some limitations on that flexibility by stating:
In determining when to hold a hearing, the Commission must respect the
due process rights of the parties that come before it. Further, the Commission should consider its own interests and those of the parties in having
disputes heard in a timely fashion, but with ample time to prepare for the
hearing. Ultimately, the Commission must conduct hearings within a rea-

253. Tuba City Judicial Dist. v. Sloan, 8 Nav. R. 159, 170 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2001) (citation omitted).
254. 15 N.N.C. § 611.
255. The Act delegates to the NNLC “the authority to adopt and implement, on its own initiative and
without any approval, rules of procedure and practice governing the conduct of proceedings under § 611 of the
Act, provided that such rules are consistent with the provisions of the Act.” 15 N.N.C. § 616. Pursuant to this
authority, the NNLC has adopted (and subsequently amended) the Rules of Procedures for Proceedings
Before the Navajo Nation Labor Commission. The amended Rules “apply to all proceedings before the Navajo
Nation Labor Commission . . . pursuant to the Navajo Preference in Employment Act.” RULES OF PROCEDURES FOR PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE NAVAJO NATION LABOR COMMISSION 1 (as amended by Res. NNLCDEC-01-2009 (Dec. 1, 2009)) (on file with Howard L. Brown) [hereinafter NNLC RULES].
256. 15 N.N.C. § 610(I), (J).
257. See id. § 610(B)(4), (J)(1)(c); Martinez v. Sage Mem’l Hosp., No. SC-CV-47-06, slip op. at 3 (Nav.
Sup. Ct. August 7, 2007). The Navajo Nation Supreme Court has characterized the 365-day time limit for filing
a charge with the ONLR and the 360-day time limit for filing a complaint with the NNLC as nonjurisdictional
statutes of limitations that may be waived by failure of the respondent to plead them as a defense and which
are subject to equitable tolling. See Yazzie v. Tooh Dineh Indus., No. SC-CV-67-05, slip op. at 4 (Nav. Sup. Ct.
September 20, 2006); Peabody W. Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation Labor Comm’n, 8 Nav. R. 488, 491 (Nav. Sup. Ct.
2004). Circumstances that might justify equitable tolling of these statutes of limitations include (1) conduct by
the respondent that contributes to the petitioner’s failure to meet the time limitations and (2) extraordinary
circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control making it impossible to timely file. See Tooh Dineh, slip op. at 4;
see also Werito v. Tuba City Unified Sch. Dist. No. 15, No. SC-CV-03-07, slip op. at 3–4 (Nav. Sup. Ct. April 6,
2009). The potential unjust prejudice to the respondent due to the loss of evidence or disappearance of witnesses must be weighed against these considerations. See Tooh Dineh, slip op. at 4.
258. 15 N.N.C. § 611(A), (A)(1); NNLC RULES, supra note 255, R. 7. The Amended Rules also provide
that, within three days of the filing of a complaint (except when filed by the ONLR) a copy will be mailed to
the Director of the ONLR and the Attorney General of the Navajo Nation. NNLC RULES, supra note 255, R.
7.
259. Dilcon Navajo Westerner/True Value Store v. Jensen, 8 Nav. R. 28, 36 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2000); NNLC
RULES, supra note 255, R. 7.

R
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sonable amount of time from the filing of the complaint, and it may not
cause excessive or undue delays in so doing.260

Within twenty calendar days after the employer receives the NNLC’s notice of
hearing, the employer must file a written answer to the complaint.261 An employer
who files a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is not required to file an answer until ten days after the NNLC rules on the motion to dismiss, assuming such
ruling is a denial of the motion.262 Failure to file an answer is deemed to be an
admission of the allegations in the complaint.263
The NNLC has subpoena power compelling disclosure of evidence and attendance of witnesses at the hearing.264 The NNLC is not bound by any formal rules of
evidence, although the parties have the right to legal counsel, to present witnesses,
and to cross-examine witnesses.265 As originally enacted, the Act stated that “the
burden of proof shall be upon the respondent to show compliance with the provisions of this Act by clear and convincing evidence.”266 In Manygoats v. Cameron
Trading Post, however, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court held that the “clear and
convincing” evidence standard violated the due process rights of employers under
the Navajo Nation Bill of Rights.267 The Act now provides that the evidentiary
standard shall be “preponderance of the evidence,” although the burden of proof
is still the employer’s to bear.268 When the NNLC finds in favor of an employee
whose claim included a request for emotional damages, the NNLC may hold a
damages hearing; at such hearing, the employee has the burden of proof.269
3. Exhaustion of Employer’s Internal Remedies
It is not unusual for employers to provide a process by which employees can
lodge complaints, pursue grievances, and appeal certain adverse employment decisions. In the case of Taylor v. Dilcon Community School, the defendant school
terminated Louise Taylor’s employment.270 The school’s personnel manual provided that employees could appeal termination decisions to the school’s governing
260. Dilcon, 8 Nav. R. at 37.
261. NNLC RULES, supra note 255, R. 11.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. 15 N.N.C. § 611(A)(2)–(3); NNLC RULES, supra note 255, R. 14.
265. 15 N.N.C. § 611(C); NNLC RULES, supra note 255, R. 15(E), (F), (G).
266. See 15 N.N.C. § 611(B) (1995) (amended 2005); see also Manygoats v. Cameron Trading Post
(Manygoats I), 8 Nav. R. 3, 17–19 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2000) (holding that the original clear and convincing standard
of section 611(B) violated due process).
267. See id. at 19.
268. 15 N.N.C. § 611(B) (West Supp. 2008); NNLC RULES, supra note 255, R. 15(K). In Manygoats I,
the court also considered the issue of whether the Act’s allocation of the burden of proof (requiring that the
employer, rather than the employee, bear the burden or proof) violated due process of law. See Manygoats I, 8
Nav. R. at 17–18; see also Manygoats v. Atkinson Trading Co. (Manygoats II), 8 Nav. R. 321, 335–36 (Nav.
Sup. Ct. 2003). The court concluded that it does not. See Manygoats I, 8 Nav. R. at 17–18; see also Manygoats
II, 8 Nav. R. at 335–36. It is notable, however, that under Silentman v. Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co.,
the employee and not the employer has the burden of showing that he or she is actually qualified for the
position in question. 8 Nav. R. 306, 312 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2003). Presumably, the NNLC and the supreme court
would deal with this situation by using a “burden-shifting” analysis such that the employee would be required
to show that he or she is qualified and, if the employee makes such a showing, the burden would then shift to
the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it complied with the Act.
269. NNLC RULES, supra note 255, R. 15(O).
270. 8 Nav. R. 717, 720 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2005).

R
R
R
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board.271 Ms. Taylor appealed her termination, the school scheduled a hearing on
Ms. Taylor’s appeal, and Ms. Taylor failed to appear at the hearing.272 Ms. Taylor
subsequently filed a charge with the ONLR and then a complaint with the
NNLC.273 The school argued, and the NNLC agreed, that the complaint should be
dismissed because of Ms. Taylor’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies.274
On appeal to the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, the school argued that Ms. Taylor
should have been required to exhaust her administrative remedies and that “even
in the absence of explicit NPEA authorization,” the NNLC is authorized to determine its own jurisdiction or to refuse to hear cases based on the exhaustion doctrine.275 The court disagreed, holding that the “ONLR charge process is the only
statutory requirement before an employee may file a complaint with the Commission, and therefore there is no implied requirement to exhaust an employer’s termination appeal process.”276
4. Res Judicata: The Effect of Prior Proceedings
In the case of Peabody Western Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation Labor Commission,
the court ruled that the doctrine of res judicata barred an employee from bringing
his claim to the NNLC because the claim had already been adjudicated by an arbitrator pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.277 The court outlined the four familiar elements that must be met in order for the doctrine of res
judicata to apply: (1) the parties in the second action must be the same as, or in
privity with, the parties in the first action; (2) the cause of action must be the same
or must arise from the same transaction or event; (3) there must have been a final
decision in the first action; and (4) the first decision must have been on the merits.278 The court acknowledged “that there may be exceptions to the general applicability of the doctrine of res judicata when the claims in question are claims of
racial or gender-based discrimination.”279
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 721.
276. Id. at 723. Notably, the Task Force’s 1990 Report includes a suggestion made by the industry group
to amend the NPEA to require disciplined or terminated employees to exhaust the employer’s grievance or
complaint procedure before filing a charge with the ONLR. Task Force’s 1990 Report, supra note 39, at 49.
The Task Force concurred “in the Industry Group’s expressed objective of devising mechanisms for a fair and
expeditious internal resolution of employee grievances” and stated, “Neither employers or [sic] the Nation
wish to engage in expensive and time-consuming litigation where the underlying dispute is susceptible to an
informal settlement within the company.” Id. at 50. Nonetheless, the Task Force recommended against the
industry group’s suggestion and instead proposed “that the question of deferral to employer/union grievance
procedures be considered and, if appropriate, incorporated in the Navajo preference plans which each employer is required to adopt.” Id. at 51.
277. See 8 Nav. R. 313, 318–20 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2003). Although the NPEA does not address the issue of
res judicata, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court has recognized the NNLC’s authority to dismiss cases where
res judicata applies. Taylor, 8 Nav. R. at 723.
278. See Peabody, 8 Nav. R. at 319.
279. Id. at 320 (citing McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) and Duffield v. Robertson
Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also Bradley v. Lake Powell Med. Ctr., No. SC-CV-55-05, slip
op. at 7–11 (Nav. Sup. Ct. February 16, 2007) (elaborating on the four elements required for res judicata to
apply, explaining the public policy behind the doctrine, and commenting that res judicata “promotes fairness
between parties, and is consistent with the Dine’ bi beenahaz’aanii value of finality”).

R
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5. Administrative Jurisdiction over Claims Outside of the Act
Neither the ONLR nor the NNLC have jurisdiction over claims outside of the
Act.280 The NNLC (and presumably the ONLR) must determine whether the complaining employee has asserted claims outside of the Act and, if so, must dismiss
the entire complaint, including any claims arising under the NPEA.281 As the court
discussed in Navajo Sanitation:
The [NNLC] has jurisdiction only to hear claims arising under the NPEA,
and cannot hear other claims an employee might bring against an employer.
Therefore, if any of the claims Yazzie brings against Sanitation are not
within the scope of the NPEA, the Commission was required to dismiss all
of them. As noted above, Yazzie’s complaint describes his claims as concerning “job harassment, sexual harassment, retaliation, and intimidation,”
and violations of “due process,” “civil rights,” and Sanitation’s employment
policies. However, a careful reading of his complaint shows that all of these
various descriptions concern and arise out of the alleged incident of sexual
harassment by his supervisor.282

Based on its reading of Mr. Yazzie’s complaint, the supreme court affirmed the
NNLC’s decision that it did not have jurisdiction over Mr. Yazzie’s claim of sexual
harassment and therefore was required to dismiss Mr. Yazzie’s entire complaint.283
6. Remedies and Relief
If the NNLC finds that an employer violated the Act, it may award the employee a variety of remedies and relief, including, without limitation, “directed hiring, reinstatement, displacement of non-Navajo employees, back-pay, front-pay,
injunctive relief, [and] mandated corrective action to cure the violation.”284 Liability for back-pay and other forms of compensatory damages may not accrue from a
date that is more than two years prior to the date of filing of the ONLR charge
that is the basis for the complaint.285 If the NNLC concludes that the employer’s
violation of the Act was intentional, it may impose civil fines.286
The list of remedies set forth in the Act is not exhaustive. In Navajo Sanitation,
the Navajo Nation Supreme Court stated:
This Court previously described the Commission’s authority to grant remedies as discretionary, and equated it with the Navajo principle of nályééh.
The Court emphasized that the NPEA empowered the Commission to
mold remedies for NPEA violations to make an employee whole based on
the unique circumstances of the case. Consistent with these principles, the
Court holds that the Commission is not restricted to the specific listed remedies in Section 612(A)(1), but is empowered to grant remedies reasonably

280.
Charles v.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

See Yazzie v. Navajo Sanitation, No. SC-CV-16-06, slip op. at 5 (Nav. Sup. Ct. July 11, 2007);
Furniture Warehouse, 7 Nav. R. 92, 95 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1994).
See Charles, 7 Nav. R. at 95.
Navajo Sanitation, No. SC-CV-16-06, slip op. at 5 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1, 5.
15 N.N.C. § 612(A)(1).
See id.
See id.
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tied to making an employee whole. What is reasonably tied depends on the
circumstances of the case, but certain remedies are not reasonably tied to
making a person whole in any circumstance, such as compelling an employer to fire a worker based on a complaint by another employee, as that
remedy does not compensate the employee claimant, it simply punishes the
other employee.287

A successful complainant’s damages are calculated differently depending on
whether the complainant was working under a definite or indefinite term contract.288 As the court stated in Office of Navajo Labor Relations v. West World,
“Where an employee is hired for a definite term and thereafter wrongfully terminated, the measure of damages is the unpaid balance of the employee’s salary less
the sums earned or which could have reasonably been earned during the remainder of the contract period.”289 By contrast, “the period of compensation for wrongful discharge in breach of an indefinite term contract normally runs from the date
of the discharge to the time of judgment.”290
Also, if the NNLC concludes that the employer’s “position” was “not substantially justified,” it can award the employee’s costs and attorneys’ fees.291 Notably,
the employer has the burden “to prove its litigating position was substantially justified to avoid paying the employee’s costs and fees.”292 Although the Act does not
define “position” or what it means to be “substantially justified,” the Navajo Nation Supreme Court has provided guidance. In a 2003 decision, the Court determined that an employee was entitled to its costs and fees where the employer’s
“legal arguments were at best misguided, and its evidence ranged from thin to
lacking in credibility.”293 In a 2009 decision, Goldtooth v. Naa Tsis’ Aan Community School, Inc., the court further discussed the meaning of “position” and “substantially justified.”294 With respect to the former, the court held “that the overall
conduct of a respondent-employer, including pre-litigation conduct, will be considered in the decision whether the employer’s litigating position was substantially
justified” and that “the overall conduct of the employer will be reviewed under a
reasonable person standard.”295 With respect to the meaning of “substantially justified,” the court held:
[T]he employer’s overall conduct will be weighed against the statutory
mandate; i.e., does the employer’s overall conduct justify nullifying the
mandate that a prevailing employee shall be paid costs and attorney’s fees?
The Court further holds that because this exercise is a weighing of the reasonableness of each party’s conduct, the award of costs and attorney’s fees
is not an all or nothing proposition. . . .

287. Navajo Sanitation, No. SC-CV-16-06, slip op. at 4 (citations omitted).
288. See Office of Navajo Labor Relations v. West World, 7 Nav. R. 84, 86 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1994).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. 15 N.N.C. § 612(A)(2). The NPEA does not provide for attorneys’ fees to be paid to the respondent in the event the respondent prevails.
292. Dilcon Navajo Westerner/True Value Store v. Jensen, 8 Nav. R. 28, 41 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2000).
293. Manygoats v. Atkinson Trading Co. (Manygoats II), 8 Nav. R. 321, 339 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2003).
294. Goldtooth v. Naa Tsis’ Aan Cmty. Sch., Inc. (Goldtooth II), No. SC-CV-12-06, slip op. at 4–6 (Nav.
Sup. Ct. April 16, 2009).
295. Id. at 5–6.
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We hereby hold [that] an employer shall be deemed “substantially justified” as that term is used in [the Act] when the respondent-employer shows
1) that the employee’s pleading or document was not submitted in good
faith, or that it contains material misstatement of fact or law; or that it is
not made upon adequate investigation or research or 2) that the employee
failed to participate in the proceedings. We emphasize that such exceptions
and the substantial justification decision must be established by specific
findings by the NNLC.296

7. Enforcement and Appeals of NNLC Decisions
NNLC decisions may be enforced through proceedings brought in the district
courts of the Navajo Nation.297 Any party may appeal a decision of the NNLC
directly to the Navajo Nation Supreme Court by filing a written appeal within ten
days after receipt of the NNLC’s decision.298 The supreme court reviews decisions
of the NNLC under an abuse of discretion standard.299 The court summarized the
extent of its power to review NNLC decisions in Jackson v. BHP World Minerals
as follows:
We review decisions of the Commission under an abuse of discretion
standard. Among other things, the Commission abuses its discretion when
it makes an erroneous legal conclusion, or if its factual findings are not
“supported by substantial evidence.” We review the legal conclusions de
novo, with no deference given to the Commission’s interpretation of the
law. Our review of the factual findings is more deferential. This Court will
find that a decision is “supported by substantial evidence” where, after examining the relevant evidence, a “reasonable mind could accept [the evidence] as adequate to support the conclusion, even if it is possible to draw
two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence. . . . [W]hether the [employer’s] notice given was adequate or whether the facts as a matter of law
rise to “just cause” are legal questions we review de novo.300

V. THE NAVAJO PREFERENCE IN EMPLOYMENT ACT AND
NAVAJO CUSTOMARY LAW
A. Background and Application of Customary Law
In recent years, the Navajo Nation government has emphasized the importance
of applying Navajo traditional or customary laws in adjudicating disputes and pass296. Id. at 6–7 (footnote omitted). It is somewhat difficult to imagine how an employer can meet such a
test, given that the NNLC will only reach this analysis if the employee prevailed. Given that the employee
prevailed, it is unlikely that (1) the employee’s pleading was not submitted in good faith, contained material
misstatements of fact or law, or that it was not made upon adequate investigation or research or (2) that the
employee failed to participate in the proceedings.
297. 15 N.N.C. § 612(C).
298. Id. § 613(A); see also NNLC RULES supra note 255 at 18.
299. E.g., Yazzie v. Navajo Sanitation, No. SC-CV-16-06, slip op. at 3 (Nav. Sup. Ct. July 11, 2007)
(citations omitted); Taylor v. Dilcon Cmty. Sch., 8 Nav. R. 717, 721 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2005).
300. 8 Nav. R. 560, 568–69 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004) (first alteration in original) (citations omitted). The
court noted that its holding that the issue of “just cause” is a legal question that is reviewed de novo overruled
its previous statements that “just cause” is a factual issue for which the court would defer to the NNLC. Id. at
569 n.1.
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ing legislation. “Navajo common law, or traditional law, ‘reflects the customs, usages and traditions of the Navajo People, formed by Navajo values in action.’”301
Navajo Nation courts “fashion accepted customs and practices into a contemporary, working common law in a similar manner as do judges in other cultures and
legal systems.”302
Although Navajo judges have been applying customary law since the days of the
Navajo Court of Indian Offenses (operated from 1892 to 1959), it was not until
2002 that the Navajo Nation Council expressed its desire that the Navajo Nation
courts “utilize Diné bi beenahaz’áanii (Navajo Traditional, Customary, Natural, or
Common Law) to guide the interpretation of Navajo Nation statutory laws and
regulations.”303 On statutory interpretation, the Navajo customary principle of ná
bináheezláago bee t’áá łahjı́ ałgha’ deet’á, holds that statutes are to be read and
interpreted as a whole, meaning that all parts of a statute must be given meaning.304 Diné bi beehaz’áanii is the term used by traditional Navajos to mean the
Navajo fundamental laws,305 which are the values, customs, and traditions found in
Navajo culture, spirituality, language, and sense of place (i.e., profound attachment
to land).
In its broader application, Diné bi beehaz’áaanii includes Navajo common law
(customary law), statutory law, administrative regulations, and court-made law. Title 7, section 204 of the Navajo Nation Code also allows use of customary law
“whenever Navajo Nation statutes or regulations are silent on matters in dispute
before the courts.”306 Skirting the boundary between what is considered acceptable
for dispute resolution and what should be categorized as guarded knowledge may
arise during the course of litigation. For example, the traditional Navajo narratives
relating the “Twin Warriors’ Journey to the Father” are told only during the winter.
Therefore, the Navajo Nation courts may be prohibited from utilizing certain concepts from this narrative. Section 204 allows the Navajo Nation courts to consult
traditionalists, or Navajo people of knowledge (e.g., elders and traditional ceremonial practitioners), to help determine the appropriate interpretation and application of customary law during litigation.307 These custom-savvy people can help a
Navajo court decide whether a value is appropriate for adversarial litigation or
whether it belongs solely to Diné spiritual (i.e., religious) practice. Finally, a word
of caution is necessary here. Some Navajo customary principles (e.g., hózhó—
glossed as harmony, balance, and peace) are difficult to translate into the English
301. Howard L. Brown, The Navajo Nation’s Peacemaker Division: An Integrated, Community-Based
Dispute Resolution Forum, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 297, 298 (2000) (quoting Philmer Bluehouse & James W.
Zion, Hozhooji Naat’aanii: The Navajo Justice and Harmony Ceremony, 10 MEDIATION Q. 327, 328 (1993)).
302. Id. at 299 (citing Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L.
REV. 225, 244 (1994)).
303. 7 N.N.C. § 204(A); see also Navajo Nation Council Res. CO-72-03 (Nov. 5, 2003). Section 204 is the
present Navajo choice of law statute and has as its source an old Navajo Court of Indian Offenses regulation
from the 1930s. The regulation allowed the Navajo Court of Indian Offenses to use “any . . . customs of the
tribe” that were not prohibited by federal laws. See Special Regulations Governing Law and Order on the
Navajo and Hopi Jurisdictions in Arizona and New Mexico, 3 Fed. Reg. 1134, 1135 (May 18, 1938) (codified at
25 C.F.R. § 11.500 (2008)).
304. Goldtooth v. Naa Tsis’Aan Cmty. Sch. (Goldtooth II), No. SC-CV-12-06, slip op. at 4 (Nav. Sup. Ct.
April 16, 2009).
305. See 1 N.N.C. §§ 201–206.
306. 7 N.N.C. § 204(A).
307. See id. § 204(B).

\\server05\productn\N\NMX\40-1\NMX102.txt

62

unknown

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Seq: 46

28-OCT-10

10:02

[Vol. 40

language because they describe broad, interlinking concepts in Navajo culture.
However, even difficult concepts have been glossed and used in litigation and
court decisions without any problems.
The statutory pronouncements identified above are applicable to issues of interpretation and application of the NPEA and have been used by the Navajo Nation
Supreme Court in a number of recent cases. In Kesoli, the court used “words are
sacred,” a longstanding traditional principle, to hold that the employer had met the
“just cause” standard under the NPEA to terminate a supervisor (naat’áanii).308
The supervisor had engaged in a pattern of shouting at his subordinates that the
court said amounted to harassment of other employees.309 In reaching this conclusion, the court stated:
Words are sacred and never frivolous in Navajo thinking and are not to be
used to offend or intimidate, particularly in Kesoli’s position of supervisor,
which, in the context of Navajo thinking makes him a naat’áanii. As a
naat’áanii he had a responsibility to conduct himself thoughtfully and carefully with respect for his employees under the principle of házhó’ógo, including utilizing the k’é mechanisms Anderson provides to deal with
disputes among employees.310

The Navajo Nation Supreme Court’s analysis in Kesoli shows that it first identified the supervisor as a naat’áanii (leader), as it should, and then applied the responsibility that leaders have, according to the doctrine of házhó’ógo (responsible
exercise of freedoms), to use k’é (positive values) when dealing with subordinates.311 In effect, the court is telling the supervisor that it is wrong for a naat’áanii
to use authority (which includes oral use of words) to harass or abuse subordinates. When employer and employee observe the principles and values identified
by the supreme court (stated in the quote above), the result is a working relationship driven by mutual respect, or as a Navajo would say, things are done according
to k’é.
In the Kesoli case, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court took the naat’áanii principle out of the political or governing context and applied it to a supervisor in a
private employment dispute. Navajos believe that their political leaders (i.e.,
elected officials and heads of government departments) have a sacred, fiduciary
trust to them; therefore, leaders are expected to be honest, faithful, ethical, and
truthful while keeping the interests of the Navajo Nation at the forefront.312 At
some time, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court will have to address the extent to
which the characteristics demanded of political leaders should be applied to a
naat’áanii in the private sector.
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court joined the “words are sacred” principle with
general American contract law to construe a lease between the Navajo Nation and
308. Kesoli v. Anderson Sec. Agency, 8 Nav. R. 724, 732 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2005).
309. Id. at 729–32.
310. Id. at 732 (citations omitted).
311. See id.
312. Thinn v. Navajo Generating Station, Nos. SC-CV-25-06 & SC-CV-26-06, slip op. at 7 (Nav. Sup. Ct.
October 19, 2007); Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, 6 Nav. R. 105, 117 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1989); see also Begay v.
Navajo Dept. of Law Enforcement, NNLC 2007-048, slip op. at 7 (July 8, 2008) (“Police officers are akin to
naat’aáni’iis; thus, they are expected to conduct themselves thoughtfully and carefully at all times.”).
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the State of New Mexico for construction of a state public school on Navajo land in
Office of Navajo Labor Relations, ex rel. Bailon v. Central Consolidated School
District No. 22.313 New Mexico argued that the Navajo Nation could not force the
State to give employment preference to Navajos under the NPEA because, while
the State had expressly agreed to give such preference in a provision of the lease,
the parties had agreed in a subsequent provision that the State did not have to
comply with Navajo employment laws that violated state or federal law.314 The
State argued that giving Navajos employment preference would violate state law
prohibiting racial and national origin discrimination.315 The Navajo Nation Supreme Court held that the first provision giving Navajos employment preference,
as the explicit provision, controlled the second general provision.316 The supreme
court said its interpretation was “consistent with the Navajo Common Law principle that every word is powerful, sacred, and never frivolous. Under this principle, a
contracting party cannot give their word in one section and take it back in the
next.”317
The question of whether the Navajo Nation had waived its power to regulate
employment at a power plant operating on Navajo trust land through a lease was
decided in Thinn v. Navajo Generating Station.318 The employer power plant argued that the Navajo Nation, through its leaders, had waived its power to regulate
employment matters at the plant when it agreed not to “directly or indirectly regulate Lessees in the . . . operation” of the plant.319 The Navajo Nation Supreme
Court reiterated that Navajo leaders have a fiduciary duty to the Navajo people,
which includes protecting the collective rights of the people, as recognized by Navajo fundamental law.320 Thus, Navajo leaders cannot abdicate their fiduciary duty
by delegating their responsibility to protect rights of employees on the Navajo Nation to a non-Navajo entity. Here, the court saw such an implied delegation to the
power plant through a purported waiver in a lease that it said was not explicit and
subject to several interpretations.321 Because “words are sacred,” any alleged
waiver of a collective right of the Navajo people must be done by the Navajo Nation Council, or its empowered designee, in clear, unmistakable words.322 Moreover, the court pronounced that the NPEA applies to employers “by operation of
law,” regardless of whether they affirmatively agree to be bound by it or not.323
The “words are sacred” principle can be used to enforce employment contracts,
such as provisions that regulate the employer/employee relationship in a personnel

313. 8 Nav. R. 501 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004).
314. Id. at 504.
315. Id. at 505.
316. Id. at 506.
317. Id.
318. Nos. SC-CV-25-06 & SC-CV-26-06 (Nav. Sup. Ct. October 19, 2007).
319. Id. at 2–3.
320. Id. at 7–8 (referring to the fundamental law found at title 1, section 202, of the Navajo Nation
Code).
321. Id. at 8.
322. Id. at 5.
323. Id. at 7; see also Cedar Unified Sch. Dist. v. Navajo Nation Labor Comm’n, Nos. SC-CV-53-06 &
SC-CV-54-06, slip op. at 9 (Nav. Sup. Ct. November 21, 2007) (noting that the NPEA prohibits employers and
employees from waiving the Act by contract). For a discussion of the case disposition, see supra note 49.
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manual. In Smith v. Navajo Nation Department of Head Start,324 the Navajo Nation
Supreme Court was asked to decide whether there was just cause to terminate an
employee who had not complied with a requirement set forth in a personnel manual. According to the manual, an employee must call or report to his supervisor
within three consecutive working days of being absent from work to justify his
absence.325 The employee had been granted leave to take care of family matters,
but after his leave expired, had not returned to work or called to justify further
absence.326 The employee was fired for failing to comply with the personnel manual.327 In upholding the termination, the supreme court announced that the “words
are sacred” principle could be used to enforce rules found in a personnel manual:
A personnel manual is a contract between employer and employee, with
justifiable expectations that both employer and employee follow it to maintain harmony in the workplace. Navajos take contracts very seriously, and
this Court will enforce them. Words are sacred and never frivolous in Navajo thinking, and promises made must be fulfilled absent some compelling
reason otherwise.328

In addition, the supreme court may have created an exception to the “words are
sacred” principle when it announced that an employee could challenge enforcement of a rule in a personnel manual on grounds that it is “impossible to fulfill
under the circumstances of the case or as violating Navajo public policy.”329
In Goldtooth v. Naa Tsis’ [Aan] Community School, an executive director of a
school, who had authority to send out contract offers on behalf of the school
board, sent a letter offering an employment contract renewal to Goldtooth, though
the board had not authorized a contract renewal for him.330 Goldtooth accepted
the offer in the letter and later signed the contract, but was still unaware that the
board had not authorized his contract renewal.331 A day after signing the contract,
the executive director informed him that the board had not signed his contract
because he lacked “teacher certification.”332 The board then voted to rescind his
contract.333 The Navajo Nation Supreme Court found a binding employment contract because the executive director had apparent authority to bind the school
board.334 The supreme court relied on the Navajo concept of naat’aanii to bolster
its holding: The executive director was a naat’aanii and, as such, under Navajo
custom his words carried great weight within the community.335 Under this principle, and because it was known that the executive director had authority to offer
contracts on behalf of the school board, Goldtooth reasonably believed that he had
324. 8 Nav. R. 709, 713 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2005).
325. Id. at 713.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 714–15 (citations omitted).
329. Id. at 715; see also Tree Servicing, L.L.C. v. Duncan, No. SC-CV-46-05, slip op. at 8 (Nav. Sup. Ct.
August 18, 2008) (holding that the “words are sacred” principle makes a contract enforceable, unless its language violates Navajo public policy or Diné bi beenahaz’áanii).
330. 8 Nav. R. 682, 688 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2005).
331. Id. at 688.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 691.
335. Id. at 692.
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been offered a contract and accepted. The “words are sacred” principle, conjoined
with the naat’aanii principle, allowed the court to rule that Goldtooth was offered
a binding contract.
Words are not only “sacred,” but also “powerful” to traditional Navajo beliefs.
The “words are powerful” principle comes from the traditional belief that words
can cause injury, healing, and a multitude of other conditions depending on the
speaker’s intentions. The Navajo Nation Supreme Court discussed this principle in
Navajo Nation v. Crockett, where employees claimed that they were fired because
they attended a meeting at which they distributed unauthorized business documents and made statements accusing their employer, a Navajo Nation business
enterprise, of mismanagement and misconduct.336 The employer allegedly retaliated by firing the employees.337 In its analysis of whether the firing violated the
employees’ rights to free speech, the supreme court discussed the “words are powerful” principle:
[A]n individual has a fundamental right to express his or her mind by way
of the spoken word and/or actions. As a matter of Navajo tradition and
custom, people speak with caution and respect, choosing their words carefully to avoid harm to others. This is nothing more than freedom with responsibility, a fundamental Navajo traditional principle.338

The court ruled that a worker who is fired for speaking before a Navajo government committee on public matters involving an employer that is a Navajo Nation
enterprise has a right to challenge his termination on violation of free speech
grounds.339
The quote from the Kesoli case set forth above340 identifies two customary principles, k’é and házhó’ógo, that the Navajo Nation Supreme Court says guides
human interactions in Navajo society. Both principles, like some foundational
Navajo customary doctrines, are not amendable to precise English translation because the English language does not contain similar concepts. The term k’é encompasses all positive values (including cooperation, respect, friendliness, kindness,
love, forgiveness, and peacefulness) that facilitate positive relations and relationships in human interactions. The two principles have been used in several areas of
Navajo law, including NPEA cases.
In a case concerning a breach of an oral contract, the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court described the k’é principle as follows:
K’e recognizes “your relations to everything in the universe,” in the sense
that Navajos have respect for others and for a decision made by the group.
It is a deep feeling for responsibilities to others and the duty to live in
harmony with them. It has to do with the importance of relationships to
foster consensus and healing. It is a deeply-felt emotion which is learned
from childhood.341
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

7 Nav. R. 237, 240 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1996).
Id. at 237.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 242.
See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
Ben v. Burbank, 7 Nav. R. 222, 224 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1996).
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In a domestic relations case addressing the dependent status of a child, the supreme court said “the core of . . . k’é is maintaining respect for others, particularly . . . in one’s use of words in talking about others.”342 According to these
cases, the defining aspect of k’é is respect, a value that promotes positive relationships. Thus, in the area of employment, it is respect that facilitates positive
employer/employee relationships.
The házhó’ógo and k’é principles guide conduct during interactions between
people. The two principles create an environment that promotes use of positive
values so that relationships are maintained. As the Navajo Nation Supreme Court
notes below, házhó’ógo generally describes respectful, patient, and considerate behavior in the presence of others, especially during community discussions of emotional issues:
Házhó’ógo is not a man-made law, but rather a fundamental tenet informing us how we must approach each other as individuals. When discussions
become heated, whether in a family setting, in a community meeting or
between any people, it’s not uncommon for an elderly person to stand and
say “házhó’ógo, házhó’ógo sha ‘álchı́nı́.” The intent is to remind those involved that they are [Navajo people] dealing with [other Navajo people],
and that therefore patience and respect are due.343

In the employment context, and as the Kesoli case instructs, the házhó’ógo principle promotes respectful discussions of work-related issues among employees, supervisor and employee, and employer and employee.
B. Remedies or Nályééh Under the Act
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court has incorporated into recent decisions Navajo customary law concerning remedies available under the NPEA. In Tso v. Navajo Housing Authority, the NNLC entered a judgment of back pay and other
damages against the employer, the Navajo Housing Authority (NHA).344 Among
other arguments, the NHA claimed that it could not be forced to use federal funds
to pay the judgment. The Navajo Nation Supreme Court held that certain values
inherent in Diné bi’ó’ool’iił (the Navajo Life Way) require the NHA to satisfy the
judgment using non-federally granted money.345 The court stated:
While nothing in our Navajo statutory law relieves the NHA from its
responsibility to Mr. Tso, there are central principles of Diné bi’ó’ool’iił
(the Navajo Life Way) that affirmatively require the NHA to satisfy the
judgment. . . . [T]he important thing is that the NHA have respect for
others and for decisions made by the Labor Commission, the lower court,
and this Court. Diné bi’ó’ool’iił recognizes our relationships to each other
and the responsibilities that those relationships create.346

342. Baldwin v. Chinle Family Court, No. SC-CV-37-08, slip op. at 4 (Nav. Sup. Ct. October 30, 2008).
343. Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez, 8 Nav. R. 604, 615 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004) (footnote omitted). The term
sha ‘álchı́nı́ means “my children.” Id. at n.3.
344. No. SC-CV-20-06, slip op. at 1 (Nav. Sup. Ct. December 6, 2007).
345. Id. at 6–7.
346. Id.
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The supreme court used the traditional postulate which states that relationships
must be maintained for Navajo society to function in harmony (i.e., the k’é and
házhó’ógo principles) to support its decision.
In an earlier case involving the same parties, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court
held that the NNLC’s authority to grant remedies was discretionary and consistent
with the traditional principle of nályééh.347 The NHA was found to have fired T.
Ernest Tso without just cause.348 Therefore, Mr. Tso was entitled to back pay under
the principle of nályééh with an offset for unemployment benefits that he received.349 Nályééh is “compensation for an injury. However, it has a deeper meaning of a demand to ‘make right’ for an injury and an invitation to negotiate what it
will take so that an injured party will have ‘no hard feelings.’”350 Much of the
supreme court’s descriptions of nályééh come from the area of tort damages.
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court has said that “nályééh is based upon the
effects of the injury, and it should be enough so that there are no hard feelings.”351
The supreme court elaborated further on the nályééh principle in Benally v. Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd., a case dealing with the dismissal of a wrongful death
action and the question of whether the appellants could sue for damages after
having applied for and received state workers’ compensation benefits.352 In the
course of upholding the trial court’s dismissal of the action, the supreme court
described nályééh as follows:
Nályééh is a unique Navajo principle that is used to redress civil wrongs. It
is akin to, but not quite the same, as the Anglo-European concepts of restitution and reparation. The similarity is that nályééh requires payment or
compensation to people who are injured, but it is quite different in its procedures. That is, when courts require the payment of restitution or reparation for an injury, they assess the injured person’s actual damages and
attempt to make that person whole. Nályééh has an additional procedural
aspect which addresses relationships. Nályééh does not simply require restitution or reparation, but calls upon the person who has caused an injury or
is responsible for an injury to talk out both compensation and
relationships.353

The actual elements of nályééh, usually discussed by the participants during the
civil process of “talking things out,” includes apology for the wrong committed,
forgiveness, and restitution to make the injured person whole.354 Following apology
and forgiveness, the “talking things out” process addresses the amount of reparation or compensation needed to restore positive relationships among the parties,

BAL

347. Tso v. Navajo Hous. Auth., 8 Nav. R. 548, 559 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004).
348. Id. at 554–55.
349. Id. at 559–60.
350. Benally v. Big A Well Serv. Co., 8 Nav. R. 60, 67 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2000).
351. Singer v. Nez, 8 Nav. R. 122, 130 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2001).
352. 8 Nav. R. 171 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2001).
353. Id. at 176.
354. See RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON LAW, A TRADITION
SELF-GOVERNANCE 79 (2009).

OF

TRI-
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the families, and the clan.355 Navajo dispute resolution has the goal of restoring
relationships among people.
Although the Navajo Nation Supreme Court has not specifically said so, attorney’s fees and costs of litigation would be recoverable under the ambit of nályééh.
In Goldtooth v. Naa Tsis’ Aan Community School, the NNLC denied the employee’s request for costs and attorney’s fees after the case had been remanded.356
On a further appeal, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court held that the NPEA required the NNLC to consider whether an employee was entitled to costs and attorney’s fees anytime it found that an employer had violated the NPEA and whether
the employee requested them or not.357 The supreme court then relied on customary principles to hold that the employee could recover those costs and fees because
the employer had not objected to the request, “The Diné principles of bił ch’iiniya
(one has lost an opportunity) and ‘words are sacred and never frivolous in Navajo
thinking,’ dictate that [the employer] waived and/or conceded that costs and attorney’s fees can be awarded in this case.”358 The court used “Navajo thinking” or
tradition to find that the employer had admitted that the employee was entitled to
recover his costs and attorney’s fees.
VI. THE NAVAJO PREFERENCE IN EMPLOYMENT ACT AND
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
The NPEA provides for “tribal preference.” That is, the Act requires employers
to prefer members of the Navajo Nation over members of other Indian Nations, as
well as over non-Indians.359 The Act is not alone in recognizing and sanctioning
tribal preference practices. Certain federal laws, including the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, also recognize tribal preference.360 In contrast to the concept of tribal preference, “Indian preference” requires employers to
give preferential treatment to people who are enrolled members of any Indian
Nation, without regard to tribal affiliation or membership.361 A number of federal

355. See id.
356. Goldtooth v. Naa Tsis’ Aan Cmty. Sch., Inc. (Goldtooth II), No. SC-CV-12-06, slip op. at 1 (Nav.
Sup. Ct. April 16, 2009).
357. Id. at 7.
358. Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
359. See 15 N.N.C. § 604(A)(1). However, section 604(B)(4) states that:
When contracting with any federal agency, the term Indian preference may be substituted
for Navajo preference for federal purposes, provided that any such voluntary substitution
shall not be construed as an implicit or express waiver of any provision of the Act nor a
concession by the Navajo Nation that this Act is not fully applicable to the federal contract
as a matter of law.
Id. § 604(B)(4).
360. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450e(c) (2006) (commanding that, with respect to certain “self-determination contracts” (defined in § 450b(j) as contracts entered
into under Part A of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act) that are intended to benefit one Indian Nation, “the tribal employment . . . preference laws adopted by such tribe shall govern” (emphasis added)); Tribal Preference Requirements, 48 C.F.R. § 1426.7005 (2009) (providing that where the work
to be performed is on an Indian Nation, the contracting officer may add “specific Indian preference requirements of the Tribe on whose reservation the work is to be performed” but adding that nothing in this part shall
preclude Indian Nations from “developing and enforcing their own tribal preference requirements,” so long as
such requirements do not become a requirement of the contracts covered by this part and do not “hinder the
Government’s right to award contracts” (emphasis added)).
361. For example, 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5 states:
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cases have addressed, or are currently addressing, the question of whether the
NPEA’s tribal preference requirements are contrary to the antidiscrimination
prohibitions contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.362 This and similar issues have also been raised in several Navajo Nation Supreme Court cases.363
Title VII prohibits employers from engaging in discrimination on the basis of an
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.364 Title VII contains a narrow exception allowing certain employers to give preference in employment to
Indians who live on or near an Indian reservation.365 Specifically, this exception
states:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall apply to any business or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any publicly announced employment practice of such business or enterprise under which a
preferential treatment is given to any individual because he is an Indian
living on or near a reservation.366

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and certain litigants have taken the position that Title VII allows Indian preference (pursuant to
the Indian preference exception quoted above) but prohibits tribal preference (including Navajo preference under the NPEA) as tantamount to unlawful national
origin discrimination.367
In Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District (Dawavendewa I), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the question
of whether the Salt River Project’s (SRP) practice of granting tribal preference to
Navajos (as required by SRP’s lease with the Navajo Nation) was permissible

It shall not be a violation of the equal opportunity clause for a . . . contractor to extend a
publicly announced preference in employment to Indians living on or near an Indian reservation in connection with employment opportunities on or near an Indian reservation . . . [S]uch a preference shall not, however, discriminate among Indians on the basis
of religion, sex, or tribal affiliation . . . .
41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5(a)(7) (2008) (emphasis added).
362. See, e.g., EEOC v. Peabody W. Coal Co., No. CV 01-01050-PHX-MHM, 2006 WL 2816603, at *4
(D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2006) (dismissing on other grounds the EEOC’s argument that lease terms required by the
NPEA unlawfully discriminated against non-Navajo Indians); Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. (Dawavendewa I), 154 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 1998).
363. See, e.g., Cedar Unified Sch. Dist. v. Navajo Nation Labor Comm’n, Nos. SC-CV-53-06 & SC-CV54-06, slip op. at 10–12 (Nav. Sup. Ct. November 21, 2007); see also Office of Navajo Labor Relations, ex rel.
Bailon v. Central Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 22, 8 Nav. R. 501, 504–05 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004); Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Office of Navajo Labor Relations, 6 Nav. R. 246, 256–67 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1990). For a discussion of Cedar
Unified Sch. Dist. disposition, see supra note 49.
364. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
365. Id. § 2000e-2(i). As an aside, Indian Nations are specifically excluded from the definition of “employer” under Title VII. Id. § 2000e(b)(1). Therefore, Indian Nation governments are not subject to Title VII’s
antidiscrimination provisions and, presumably, are permitted to apply tribal preference in their own employment activities. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.027, POLICY STATEMENT ON
INDIAN PREFERENCE UNDER TITLE VII (1988), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/indian_preference.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2010) (“Since Indian tribes are exempt from the provisions of the
Act under Section 701(b)(1), preferences or requirements based on tribal membership or affiliation imposed
by a tribe with respect to its own employment practices are not violative of Title VII.”).
366. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i).
367. See, e.g., EEOC v. Peabody W. Coal Co. (Peabody I), 214 F.R.D. 549, 561 (D. Ariz. 2002), rev’d by
EEOC v. Peabody W. Coal Co. (Peabody II), 400 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2005); Dawavendewa I, 154 F.3d at 1121;
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 365.
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under Title VII’s Indian preference exception.368 The Ninth Circuit noted that this
issue was one of first impression for federal courts.369 In analyzing the issue, the
Ninth Circuit gave “due weight” to an EEOC policy statement that the “‘extension
of an employment preference on the basis of tribal affiliation is in conflict with and
violates . . . Title VII.’”370 After analyzing the relevant issues, statutory language,
and legislative history, the court concluded that SRP’s Navajo preference practice
constituted national origin discrimination under Title VII and was not covered by
the Indian preference exception.371 The practical effect of this ruling is to prohibit
tribal preference by private employers. As stated by the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court, the ruling in Dawavendewa I means “that a private employer could not hire
a Navajo over [a member of another Indian Nation] under Navajo preference
without violating Title VII’s prohibition on ‘national origin’ discrimination.”372
Without addressing the actual merits of the case, the Ninth Circuit remanded
the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona.373 SRP, however,
sought review by the U.S. Supreme Court, but that Court denied certiorari.374 On
remand to the district court, SRP moved to dismiss based on the plaintiff’s failure
to join the Navajo Nation as an indispensable party.375 The district court agreed
and granted SRP’s motion to dismiss.376 The plaintiff appealed the district court’s
procedural ruling to the Ninth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit, in a decision known
as Dawavendewa II, affirmed the district court’s dismissal.377
Presuming that Dawavendewa II’s dismissal of the action on procedural grounds
does not impact the substantive ruling and practical effect of Dawavendewa I, private employers that are otherwise covered by the NPEA and operate within the
jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit are in the legally and financially precarious position of having to “pick their poison.” Namely, until there is a legislative fix or a
further pronouncement by the courts, these employers will have to choose between complying with Title VII and complying with the NPEA, and therefore facing the liabilities that potentially arise from one statute or the other.
The Dawavendewa cases will not be the final word on this matter, however. In a
case with remarkably similar facts as Dawavendewa, the EEOC filed a complaint
368. Dawavendewa I, 154 F.3d at 1120–24.
369. Id. at 1121.
370. Id. (quoting Policy Statement on Indian Preference Under Title VII, Fair Empl. Prac. (BNA)
405:6647, 6653 (May 16, 1988)).
371. Id. at 1124. Note, however, that in a subsequent case the Ninth Circuit characterized its holding in
Dawavendewa I as not addressing the merits of tribal preference, but merely that it considered “a hiring
preference policy based on tribal affiliation . . . stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.”
Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. (Dawavendewa II), 276 F.3d 1150, 1158
(9th Cir. 2002). In a 2005 case, the Ninth Circuit characterized the holding in Dawavendewa I as interpreting
“the Indian preference exception of Title VII, § 2000e-2(i), to permit discrimination in favor of Indians living
on or near a reservation, but not to permit discrimination against Indians belonging to other tribes.” EEOC v.
Peabody W. Coal Co. (Peabody II), 400 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Dawavendewa I, 154 F.3d at
1124).
372. Cedar Unified Sch. Dist. v. Navajo Nation Labor Comm’n, Nos. SC-CV-53-06 & SC-CV-54-06, slip
op. at 6, 11 (Nav. Sup. Ct. November 21, 2007) (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the case disposition, see
supra note 49.
373. Dawavendewa I, 154 F.3d at 1124.
374. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Dawavendewa, 528 U.S. 1098 (2000).
375. Dawavendewa II, 276 F.3d at 1154.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 1163.
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in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona against Peabody Western
Coal Company, alleging that Peabody violated Title VII by giving preference to
Navajos over non-Navajo Indians, pursuant to certain lease provisions.378 The district court ruled that an employer cannot be prosecuted for violating Title VII
when that employer is in compliance with the NPEA.379 On appeal, however, the
Ninth Circuit reversed on procedural grounds, holding, in part, that it was feasible
for the EEOC to join the Navajo Nation as a party to the lawsuit under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 19.380 Peabody sought review by the U.S. Supreme Court,
but the Court denied certiorari.381 In light of the Supreme Court’s earlier denial of
certiorari of Dawavendewa, it appears that, at least for now, the Supreme Court is
not interested in resolving the apparent conflict between Title VII and tribal preference statutes such as the NPEA. After certiorari was denied, the Navajo Nation
filed its initial pleading, a motion to dismiss, with the U.S. District Court for the
District of Arizona.382 The district court granted the Navajo Nation’s motion to
dismiss the EEOC’s complaint against the Navajo Nation, and in turn against
Peabody, holding in part that the action could not proceed without the joinder of
the Navajo Nation and the Secretary of the Department of the Interior.383
The EEOC appealed the district court’s dismissal to the Ninth Circuit.384 The
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that: (1) the Navajo Nation can be joined, not for
the purposes of being subjected to affirmative relief, but for the purpose of allowing the case against Peabody to be resolved;385 (2) the EEOC cannot seek damages against Peabody because Peabody would be unable to seek indemnification
from the Secretary of the Department of the Interior (because the Secretary would
be shielded from claims for monetary damages by the federal government’s sovereign immunity);386 and (3) the EEOC can seek injunctive relief because Peabody
and the Navajo Nation could pursue a third party complaint under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 14(a) against the Secretary for prospective, injunctive relief
preventing the Secretary from enforcing the subject lease provisions.387 Thus, the
EEOC’s claim against Peabody for injunctive relief can proceed.388 Notably, the
Ninth Circuit also vacated the district court’s decision that Navajo preference did
not violate Title VII “to allow reconsideration once the Secretary has been
brought into the suit as a third-party defendant.”389 In sum, the Ninth Circuit’s

378. See EEOC v. Peabody W. Coal Co., No. CV 01-01050-PHX-MHM, 2006 WL 2816603, at *1 (D.
Ariz. Sept. 30, 2006), dismissing on other grounds EEOC v. Peabody W. Coal Co. (Peabody I), 214 F.R.D. 549
(D. Ariz. 2002).
379. See EEOC v. Peabody W. Coal Co. (Peabody I), 214 F.R.D. 549 (D. Ariz. 2002), rev’d by EEOC v.
Peabody W. Coal Co. (Peabody II), 400 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2005).
380. See Peabody II, 400 F.3d at 783–84.
381. Peabody W. Coal Co. v. EEOC, 546 U.S. 1150 (2006).
382. See Peabody, 2006 WL 2816603, at *2.
383. See id. at *9.
384. EEOC v. Peabody W. Coal Co. (Peabody III), No. 06-17261, slip op. at 9203 (9th Cir. June 23,
2010), available at 2010 WL 2572001.
385. See id. at 9213–16.
386. See id. at 9222–23.
387. Id. at 9223–28.
388. Id. at 9229.
389. Id.
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opinion does not address the merits of tribal or Navajo preference, but simply
allows the EEOC’s case for injunctive relief against Peabody to proceed.390
Meanwhile, the EEOC filed yet another complaint in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Arizona, this time against Bashas’ Inc., the owner and operator of
grocery stores located throughout Arizona, including several stores on the Navajo
Nation.391 As of the writing of this article, the district court had stayed that case
pending the outcome of EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal Co.392
The federal courts are not alone in addressing this issue. The Navajo Nation
Supreme Court has been called upon to address the issue of the legality and enforceability of the NPEA’s tribal preference requirements in light of federal and
state prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of race and national origin. In
Cedar Unified School District v. Navajo Nation Labor Commission, the court considered the issue of whether the NNLC can hear complaints alleging wrongful termination in violation of the NPEA against public school districts organized under
the laws of the State of Arizona.393 One of the issues on appeal was whether enforcement of the NPEA against a public school district violated federal law and
whether such federal law preempts the NPEA.394 Keeping in mind that the case at
hand dealt with allegations of wrongful termination (i.e., termination without just
cause) rather than preference in hiring, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court stated:
The Court holds that Title VII has no effect on the NPEA’s “just cause”
requirement, and therefore does not prohibit [NNLC] review of Real Parties’ claims, even if [Dawavendewa I] was binding. [Dawavendewa I] concerned the preference in hiring provisions of the NPEA, and the Ninth
Circuit held that a private employer could not hire a Navajo over a Hopi
under Navajo preference without violating Title VII’s prohibition on “national origin” discrimination. Whatever the effect of that decision on Navajo preference, it has nothing to do with this case. Real Parties’ claims only
concern whether Petitioners provided “just cause” when terminating them,
a protection in the NPEA that applies to all employees within the Nation,
regardless of race or “national origin.” . . . Under the circumstances of this
case, Title VII does not preempt the NPEA and Petitioners do not violate
Title VII by defending their actions before the Commission.395

In Office of Navajo Labor Relations, ex rel. Bailon v. Central Consolidated
School District Number 22, the defendant, a New Mexico school district, had re-

390. See Docket, EEOC v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 2006 WL 2816603 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2006) (No. 01CV-01050-MHM).
391. See Complaint, EEOC v. Bashas’ Inc., No. 2:05-CV-02382 PHX-SMM (D. Ariz. Aug. 17, 2005).
392. Telephone Interview with Stephanie J. Quincy, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson (May 19, 2009) (Ms.
Quincy is counsel for Bashas’ Inc.).
393. See Nos. SC-CV-53-06 & SC-CV-54-06, slip op. at 2, 4–6 (Nav. Sup. Ct. November 21, 2007). On
April 29, 2009, the plaintiff school districts in this consolidated case filed an action in the Federal District
Court for the District of Arizona seeking a declaratory judgment and injunction against the employees and the
members of the NNLC. See Complaint, Red Mesa Unified Sch. Dist. v. Yellowhair, No. CV08071 (D. Ariz.
2009) (on file with Howard L. Brown), available at http://www.courthousenews.com/2009/04/30/Navajos.pdf.
For a discussion of the case disposition, see supra note 49.
394. See id. at 3, 10–12.
395. Id. at 11–12 (citations and footnote omitted). For more discussion regarding the principle that the
NPEA’s “just cause” requirement applies to all employees, not just Navajo employees, see supra text accompanying notes 73–82.

R
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jected the application of a Navajo candidate and instead hired a non-Indian.396 The
Navajo candidate filed a charge with the ONLR and the ONLR subsequently filed
a complaint with the NNLC on behalf of the applicant.397 On appeal, the school
district argued, among other things, that the NPEA conflicts with the New Mexico
Human Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race and national origin.398 The ONLR responded by arguing that Navajo law preempts New
Mexico law within the Navajo Nation and, even if not preempted, the New Mexico
Human Rights Act does not prohibit tribal preference because “Navajo” is a political status rather than a racial or national origin distinction.399 The supreme court
decided the case on different grounds and did not reach the issue of conflict with,
or preemption of, the New Mexico law.400
Although the Navajo Nation Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether
the NPEA’s requirement for Navajo preference runs afoul of Title VII, the court’s
discussions in Cedar Unified School District and Bailon, as well as dicta in Arizona
Public Service Co. v. Office of Navajo Labor Relations,401 shed some light on how
the court will resolve the issue if and when it is called upon to do so. At the risk of
presuming to forecast the court’s thinking on this issue, the court appears to be
setting up an argument that Navajo Nation law preempts Title VII, based on general principles of Indian Nation sovereignty, as well as the Navajo Treaty of 1868.402
It also appears that the court will be receptive to arguments that Title VII is not
implicated because tribal affiliation is a political status rather than a racial or national origin distinction (as the ONLR argued in Bailon). The “political status”
argument will presumably require briefing on complex social science issues, but it
certainly has some basis in U.S. Supreme Court precedent. In Morton v. Mancari,
for example, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Indian preference policies in hiring

396. Office of Navajo Labor Relations, ex rel. Bailon v. Central Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 22, 8 Nav. R. 501,
504 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004).
397. Id.
398. Id. at 504–05.
399. Id. at 505.
400. Id.
401. See Cedar Unified Sch. Dist. v. Navajo Nation Labor Comm’n, Nos. SC-CV-53-06 & SC-CV-54-06,
slip op. at 10–12 (Nav. Sup. Ct. November 21, 2007); Bailon, 8 Nav. R. at 504–07 (addressing similar issues
under New Mexico state law); Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Office of Navajo Labor Relations, 6 Nav. R. 246, 256–58
(Nav. Sup. Ct. 1990) (discussing federal preemption of Navajo Nation labor laws, holding that there was no
federal preemption because Indian Nation governments are exempt under Title VII, and noting further that
federal statutes of general application may be preempted by Indian treaties and principles of Indian Nation
sovereignty). For a discussion of Cedar Unified Sch. Dist. disposition, see supra note 49.
402. 15 Stat. 667. The court might, for example, rely on the “general exclusion” power set forth in
Article II of the Treaty. As interpreted and applied by the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, “Article II specifically recognizes the Navajo Nation’s authority to regulate all nonmembers, including non-Indians, other than
certain federal employees on its lands:
[T]he United States agrees that no persons except those herein so authorized to do, and
except such officers, soldiers, agents, and employees of the government, or of the Indians, as
may be authorized to enter upon Indian reservations in discharge of duties imposed by law,
or the orders of the President, shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in,
the territory described in this article.
Under the Treaty our courts have broad authority over non-Indians on land where the Navajo Nation has the
absolute right to exclude them, which includes the power to condition their presence in conformity with our
laws.” Dale Nicholson Trust v. Chavez, 8 Nav. R. 417, 428–29 (2004) (citing Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Office of
Navajo Labor Relations, 6 Nav. R. 246, 249–56 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1990)).
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by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.403 In so holding, the Court rejected the argument
that Indian preference amounted to unlawful discrimination. The Court reasoned,
“The preference is not directed towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’;
instead, it applies only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes. This operates to
exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified as ‘Indians.’ In this sense,
the preference is political rather than racial in nature.”404
The issue of reconciling the NPEA and Title VII is far from resolved. The cases
that are currently being litigated in federal courts are, as of the writing of this
article, mired in procedural matters that are keeping the courts from deciding the
merits. In any event, those cases are being pursued in the Ninth Circuit and therefore would not constitute binding precedent in areas of the Navajo Nation that are
outside of that circuit. Moreover, as the Navajo Nation Supreme Court has made
clear, those cases deal only with the Act’s Navajo preference provisions and not
the Act’s other requirements, including the just cause and written notice requirements. In any event, it is fair to anticipate that the Navajo Nation Supreme Court
will take a different approach to this issue, by analyzing the issue from the perspective of tribal sovereignty by maintaining that tribal affiliation is a political status
rather than a racial or national origin distinction.
Furthermore, there is the practical argument in favor of Navajo preference in
employment on the Navajo Nation. The Navajo employment preference provision
attempts to lower the high unemployment rate of Navajos living on the Navajo
Nation by allowing businesses to use Navajo lands, water, and other resources, and
to benefit from business-friendly federal laws that designate Indian reservations as
enterprise zones to engage in business activities. The Navajo preference in employment law is an example of an Indian Nation using its resources and sovereignty to
reduce unemployment and provide opportunities for its people within its
homelands.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Navajo Nation exerts its inherent powers of self-government in many ways,
including the regulation of the employer/employee relationship. The NPEA exemplifies the Navajo Nation’s use of its sovereign powers to legislate and adjudicate
in this area. Years of administrative decisions and Navajo Nation Supreme Court
caselaw, as well as legislative amendments to the Act, have culminated in a comprehensive preference system that impacts employment from the first stages of an
applicant’s candidacy for a position, through hiring, training, promotions, layoffs,
and terminations. The Navajo preference system should be heralded to the extent
that it has met the NPEA’s purposes of providing employment opportunities for
Navajos, promoting economic development on the Navajo Nation, and fostering
economic self-sufficiency of Navajo families.405
It cannot be denied, however, that almost twenty-five years have passed since
the NPEA was enacted and yet, unemployment on the Navajo Nation persists. As
the leaders of the Navajo Nation turn to the future, they recognize that Navajo

403. See 417 U.S. 535, 551–55 (1974).
404. Id. at 553 n.24.
405. See 15 N.N.C. § 602(A).
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preference is but one part of the solution to this persistent problem. Both the Navajo Nation Council and the Navajo Nation Supreme Court have recognized that
the Nation must do more to attract businesses that are on the front line of creating
employment opportunities. One way to attract businesses to a locale is to fashion a
business environment in which employers have a sense of certainty about the forum’s employment laws and the assurance that they will not be overwhelmed by
employment-related litigation.
As the authors, we hope that the guidance provided in this article helps to improve employer compliance with the Act, reduce employee overreaching under the
Act, and provide Navajo Nation legislators and judges with proposals for reforming the text and application of the Act in small, but important ways that continue to balance the rights of employees and the business interests of employers.
The ultimate goal of this article is to reduce litigation under the Act, thereby encouraging potential employers to locate their operations on the Navajo Nation and
to thrive and create employment opportunities where they are so badly needed.
Another of our true hopes, however, is that employer/employee relationships on
the Navajo Nation are characterized not by conflict and litigation, but by mutual
respect in accordance with k’é.

